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ABSTRACT 
 
Contrary to the assumptions of realist theory, this thesis suggests that reality is subjected 
to social constructions. The national discourse of one country constitutes the context from which 
societies will generate perceptions and ideas about another society. It is from these socially 
constructed ideas that states’ interests are formed. States interests are what constitute the foreign 
policy of a country. Given that the United States is the world’s hegemon, understanding the 
process by which countries’ interests take shape and evolve will give the United States social 
awareness and strategic advantage to lead the world’s current speedy integration with less 
volatile rivalries.  
In order to grasp the factors contributing to the relationship between specific states, some 
context is needed beforehand. By tracing and comparing historical events in the relations 
between the United States, Venezuela, and Iran, this thesis examines the constructivist claim that 
states behavior towards another is directly affected by the social interpretation of their 
interactions. It is social constructions, not power, what determines if states will view each other 
as “enemy” or “ally”. National identity and worldview ultimately drive state behavior and how 
countries choose to utilize their capabilities. 
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Introduction 
 
Political scientists formulate theories with a premise of assumptions about the real world. 
But, with the exception of the constructivist literature of the last 20 years, rarely do they 
acknowledge the socially constructed nature of those assumptions or how social constructs can 
alter perceptions of reality at a given time and place (Wendt, et al, 1992). The dominant 
framework for the way science is conducted in international relations has traditionally been 
based on the assumptions of realist theory. The influence that governments’ national identity and 
worldview might have on states’ behavior is something that realism completely leaves out of the 
equation. Instead of recognizing that multiple realities exist in the world, and that they are 
shaped by the interactions between political units (community, region, country, etc.), realist 
theory insists that states’ behavior is the direct result of the anarchical nature of the international 
system. Given its status of super power, understanding the process by which states’ interests are 
formed and evolve will give the United States social awareness and strategic advantage to lead 
today’s rapidly interconnecting world with less volatile rivalries (Burgelman, 1983). The 
leadership in the United States should be cautious about holding on to a worldview that might be 
becoming obsolete.  
  Constructivist theory aims to parsimonious explanations by having one theory that 
explains phenomena across fields of study and levels of analysis. Social constructions, like what 
is considered good or appropriate in a society, play a role on shaping the context through which 
the “real world” is understood. This must be acknowledged as an epistemological requirement to 
validate new knowledge in social sciences. Controlling for the effect that social identities exert 
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on perceptions of reality might help scholars understand states behavior more realistically. In this 
thesis, I propose that a country’s social interpretation of reality is the context for its national 
identity, and identity determines a state’s interests in the international system. Interests are more 
significant to states’ behavior in the international society than the distribution of power among 
countries (Went, 1999).  
To illustrate the explanatory potential of the identity-interest-behavior causation in 
international relations, this paper examines key historical interactions between the United States, 
Iran, and Venezuela that contributed to the current perceptions of one another. Iran and 
Venezuela, regardless of being in completely opposite global regions, both have a foreign policy 
of resistance against domination and anti-imperialist rhetoric against the United States. Tracing 
historically how each country’s current perception of the other evolved will help understand how 
the identity formation process of societies affects the likelihood that a state will view another as 
an enemy rather than an ally, or vice versa. 
Social constructions in the international system are significant for a state that wants to 
preserve its hegemony in today’s interconnected world. The United States retains more capacity 
than any other state to improve the quality of the international system (Buzan, 2009). My 
question is, to what extend is the United States hegemony affected by the presence of self-
identified “anti-imperialist” states? Is it possible that past interventions in Latin America or in 
the Middle East have set into motion an ill perception of the United States in countries like 
Venezuela and Iran, which drove them to adopt their anti-hegemonic ideology? Does that affect 
the reach of hegemonic power? Considering that now are times of economic austerity and budget 
limitations, perhaps learning about social constructs might help the United States produce a well-
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crafted foreign policy that applies political science to improve relations in the Middle East and 
Latin America simultaneously. 
 
Literature review 
 
In the study of international relations, an approach that incorporates social constructions 
has to take into consideration the ongoing assumptions of an established perception of reality 
(Zehfuss, 2002). The moment one begins to study political science it becomes clear that there are 
established agreements among scholars and politicians.  Realist theory is the oldest and most 
dominant approach to explain world phenomena within the field of international relations. 
Hence, mainstream realist theory has an effect on the way international relations are studied and 
understood, especially regarding interactions between states with uneasy relations, like the ones 
analyzed in this thesis.  
 Realism asserts that scientific theories ought to describe a reality that is largely 
independent of human thought. In other words, that reality exists independently of the observer 
(Boyd, 1983). The realist perspective draws intellectually from the materialist and individualist 
assumptions of Hobbes, Locke, and Bentham, in which the struggle for power is universal in 
time and space (Wendt, 1992). Realist theory assumes that since the world is in a state of 
anarchy, the condition of the system means states are forced to give in to their natural instinct to 
survive, and survival is tightly linked to a state’s power relative to others in the international 
system. Realism is often presented in international relations as if it were a ‘commonsense’ view 
of the world against which all other perspectives should be judged. However, because national 
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interest can be construed to mean anything, realist explanations of world phenomena are limited 
social context of a given time and place (Sadri, 2013).  
Realist theory sees security dilemma and balance of power as structural conditions, in 
which anarchy and self-help leaves states with no choice but to look after their security needs 
and expect the worst from others, which tends to lead to rising insecurity when states interpret 
the defensive capacity of others as a latent threat (Hertz, 1950). Under these assumptions, states 
react mainly to the arrangement of military capabilities within the system. But to assume that, by 
natural inertia, states are bound to always compete for power, is a depiction of the world that 
could be self-fulfilling and self-perpetuating, leading to unhealthy competition among states.  
In this thesis would like to invoke the thinking of economist Steven Levitt when he said: 
“the modern world, despite a surfeit of obfuscation, complication, and downright deceit, is not 
impenetrable, is not unknowable, and if the right questions are asked, is even more intriguing 
than we think. All it takes is a new way of looking” (2011). Constructivist approaches might be 
this “new way of looking” for international relations.  
Constructivism views the world that theories attempt to describe as constructed by 
society, which turns the ideational context of a given moment into a control variable in order for 
social theories to be interpreted realistically, and reduces the application of social sciences to the 
cognitive limitations of given social constructions (Boyd, 1983).  
Constructivists criticize material-oriented worldviews because they disregard the social 
nature and content of state interests, as well as the role of social variables in world politics 
(Checkel, 2011), and it offers an approach to study how states’ identities and interest are formed 
and then pursued. States try to do what they perceive as exemplary behavior, or the right thing by 
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the community. Normative rationality of what a “good” state is supposed to behave like depends 
on social norms and institutions, assuming that these not only define social identities, but also 
regulates behavior (Nia, 2010). If states behavior is viewed through the lens of collective 
understandings, then security dilemmas are not given by self-help but, instead, are a social 
construction states believe in and they make worst-case assumptions about each other's 
intentions (Wendt, 1992). 
If constructivist assumptions are used to analyze the international behavior of Iran and 
Venezuela, then they are understood as the result of a social phenomenon: both Iran and 
Venezuela were pushed by foreign entities (associated mainly with the United States) in a 
direction they did not want to go politically and economically. Grievances among the population 
produced a discourse against the way the United States exercises its power in the world. This 
discourse became the context for a desire for independence, understood as eliminating foreign 
influence through revolution. Both Iran and Venezuela ended up acquiring a revolutionary 
identity along with behavior associated with that identity. This fundamentally influences the 
manners by which they formulate foreign policy, and thus the way they behave in the 
international arena. Each state has shown ambitions to exert international leadership to challenge 
the international status quo, and each of them has petroleum wealth to leverage influence for that 
goal (Dodson and Dorraj, 2008). 
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Research Design 
 
For the analysis conducted in the present paper, I conceptualize reality as a socially 
constructed product of agreements among observers in the world (Mathias, 1999). I believe this 
definition captures the explanatory potential of constructivist theory, but also the significance of 
realist theory as the dominant approach to understanding international relations. I follow the 
assumption that a state will behave in accordance to its government’s identity. States are 
hierarchical “corporate actors” with an authority structure capable of imposing binding decisions 
on their population and are intrinsically dependent on social context (Wendt, 2004). 
Discourse is an agreed description of reality, and states are the institutions from which 
the government’s discourse produces communities of agreement within society (Von Glaserfield, 
1995). It is in the best interest of governments to influence constituencies’ understanding of what 
is appropriate or desired, and since collective ideas are socially constructed by interactions 
between the governments and their population over time, then Iran, Venezuela, and the United 
States, all have recognizable official themes which could be linked to historical events and 
analyzed to better understand the formation of state interests. 
 I decided to analyze Iran and Venezuela because of their seemingly unusual and warm 
alliance in spite of their cultural and geographic distance. Both governments stand together in the 
international realm, in an alliance that is knit together by a rejection of the current international 
order and the modus operandi of the United States government. In order to grasp the causes of 
the rivalry between Iran and Venezuela with the United States some context is needed 
beforehand. Perhaps their similar behavior is not caused by a material factor but by ideational 
forces instead.  
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Ideologies and identities are key to determine political orientations (like non-aligned, or 
anti-imperialist). Socially constructed values that link historical events and moral notions to 
citizens are summon upon by leaders to define a political project, and through this process, 
consensus are generated resulting in a dominant national discourse. In arguing for history to be 
used as a predominant mode of inquiry, Barrett and Srivastva (1991) suggest that all 
organizational activity contains the stamp of past events as influences on the organization’s 
present and future.  
To determine which historical occurrences are significant requires a critique of 
observable events and the social structures that generated them (Wendt, 1987). Also, discourse 
itself contains the interpretation of historical events used to justify its tone. For example, Hugo 
Chavez of Venezuela said:  
There are moments in which the entire flow of history reveals itself 
and determines the new path to be followed by the people. There 
are moments that become a compromise and an indication of a 
destiny that has to happen in order to calibrate the past and witness 
with clarity the libertarian horizon; such was the glorious [coup 
attempt of] February 4th of 1992 (Chavez, 2013).  
 
By listening the government’s message, it is obvious that the coup attempt in 1992 
against a neo-liberal president is a significant event in shaping Venezuela’s official discourse. By 
applying constructivist theory to study international relations, then it could be said that the nature 
of the international reality is the result of social interactions in a community of states that pursue 
their interest as defined by the context of a socially instituted perception.  Within the limitations 
of context in a given time and place, social discourse is to state behavior what and independent 
variable is to a dependent variable.  
  8 
By performing a historical inquiry of the nature and evolution of the international identity 
of Iran, Venezuela, and the United States, it is possible to determine the degree in which 
discourse impacted state’s behavior, and to make an educated guess as to what relations would 
look like had one of the actors engaged in a different behavior than the one that led to the current 
situation. If the dynamics at work between national identity and state behavior could be 
identified, then capable countries like the United States could strategize and the roots of 
conflictual discourse could be managed. 
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Chapter 1:  Iran-United States 
 
 
Diplomatic relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States have 
been turbulent and charged with mutual distrust since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Iranian 
leaders have been characterized as "crazy," "backward," "violent," by American politicians and 
media outlets. For instance, former President Richard Nixon described these leaders as 
“'irrational” (Nixon, 1979) in the sense that attempting to have a serious dialogue would be 
ineffective. In a similar manner, Iran’s supreme leader has depicted the United States as an 
imperial oppressor. He has criticized the United States government for being “arrogant, bullying, 
expansionist, and colonialist” with whom it is impossible to negotiate due to its corrupted 
tendencies (Khamenei, 2003). But this was not always the case; at one point Iran was one of the 
most precious U.S. allies in the Middle East. In order to understand how these two countries 
turned from being allies to existential enemies, the historical context from which the current 
hostile discourse emerged must be considered. 
In the United States, the dominant social discourse that shapes national identity sprung 
from the notion of American exceptionalism, which took its current form when conservative 
thinkers assumed a triumphalist identity of national superiority after the Allies victory in World 
War II (McCoy, 2012). Based on the agreement that the American Revolution and the American 
Constitution promotes individual liberty, equality under the law, and democracy, then many 
Americans believe the United States possesses a unique qualitative superiority among countries 
(Wood, 2011). The United States adopted a vision of self as a crusader (Kissinger, 1994) and 
ever since, a combination of American exceptionalism with a status of unrivaled superpower has 
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resulted in a popular view that perceives the United States as the greatest force for good, and 
having a moral duty to lead the world to freedom (Boot, 2003).  
With time, doubting exceptionalism is seen as "un-American” (McCoy, 2012). The 
assumption that the United States only acts in functions of its revolutionary values is socially 
ingrained in the American people since infancy, making it difficult for the population to face 
flaws in its moral history, such as slavery or cruelty against natives (Zinn, 1980). American 
exceptionalism has driven United States foreign policies into actions that were perceived as self-
righteous and are used to justify deep-rooted resentment against the United States government in 
places like Iran and Venezuela. Becoming aware of how the dynamic of national identity affects 
international relations might reveal the way to creating lasting partnerships with rival states and 
achieve a new level of international cooperation. President Barack Obama acknowledged this 
possibility when he stated, 
I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits 
believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek 
exceptionalism (Kirchick, 2009)… but I see no contradiction 
between believing that America has a continued extraordinary role 
in leading the world towards peace and prosperity and recognizing 
that that leadership is incumbent, depends on, our ability to create 
partnerships because we can't solve these problems alone (Shear & 
Wilson, 2009).  
 
Iranians certainly believe in Iranian exceptionalism as defined by their connection with 
their past and their revolutionary values. Iranians take pride in their civilization’s rich history and 
their accomplishments in literature, philosophy, medicine, astronomy, mathematics, and art 
(Johnson, 2012). European powers have intruded Iranian territories since the fifteenth century, 
beginning with the Netherlands and Portugal, and later Britain and Russia (Johnson, 2012).  
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Because of its historical colonial experience, Iranians perceive the world as a hostile and 
threatening place. They tend to be concerned about foreign powers and their intentions within 
their country. Similarly to the American Revolution’s rejection of foreign domination by the end 
of the nineteenth century, a perception that the Shah was giving away Iran's resources to 
foreigners enabled religious leaders and intellectuals to mobilize the people of Iran into 
demanding constitution to limit monarch’s power t administer national resources (Hunter, 2010).  
 
Historical Backdrop 
 
After the constitutional revolution, there have been a series of events in the interactions 
between Iran and the United States governments that became the context for both countries to 
create a social notion of the other. Iran sees the U.S. as an arrogant power that should not be 
trusted, while the U.S. views the Iranian leadership as an evil and irrational regime with whom 
no direct form of dialogue is worth having. The historical episodes that shaped these views begin 
with the CIA engineered coup d’état against Iranian prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh, 
followed by the U.S. unconditional support for the Shah for twenty-six years. Also, the Iranian 
Revolution that brought the Muslim clerics to power, the Hostage Crisis in which a group of 
students, encouraged by the revolution, took hostage the American embassy, and finally U.S. 
support for Saddam Hussein in its military venture into Iran. Each historical episode contributed 
to the construction of ideas that drive the relations of the United States and Iran even today. 
Understanding how these discourses were born can help understand how to strategize towards 
better relations in the future.  
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The CIA-Led Coup of 1953 
 
Iranians democratically elected a widely respected statesman and champion of 
nationalization, Mohammad Mosaddegh, as their prime minister (Abrahamian, 1982). The first 
event that crafted the current discourse regarding the United States in Iran happened after the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) was nationalized by Iran, as it wanted to be more 
independent and take control of its own resources. Embolden by popular strikes and intense anti-
colonialist sentiments, Mosaddegh decided that it was unfair for Iran's oil to be controlled by a 
single British company that kept most of the profits. By 1951 Iranian support for nationalization 
of the AIOC (today BP) was intense (Kinzer, 2003).  Mossadegh was regarded as a national hero 
and he took on this role to make political, economic, and societal changes, directed at ridding 
Iran of “its reliance on foreign powers” (Latorre, 2006). After a unanimous vote of both houses 
in parliament, oil was nationalized in Iran (Abrahamian, 2008). 
 Iranian oil nationalization caused a reaction in Washington and London as policymakers 
recognized the West’s reliance on oil imports. The Eisenhower administration estimated in 1954 
that the United States would be 90 per cent dependent on Middle Eastern oil by 1975 and that it 
would be indefensible from the Soviet Union in the event of supplies being lost (Marsh, 2007).  
Within the context of post World War II American exceptionalism, and realist 
fundamentalism, President Eisenhower was advised by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 
and his brother CIA Director Allen Welsh Dulles, to execute a plan to remove Prime Minister 
Mosaddegh and gain control of Iran’s natural resources by force. The Dulles brothers used a 
moralistic outlook to justify extreme reactions to world phenomena, which they viewed in stark 
black and white. They believed in the Machiavellian notion that the actions they took would be 
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justified by the end result of perpetuation of U.S. economic dominance (Schlesinger, 1999). 
There was also concern that if the USSR gained access to Persian Gulf oil, it would acquire 
advantages with grave repercussions for western wartime capabilities and for peacetime 
economic reconstruction and rearmament (Marsh, 2007). 
The decision to exercise American power with the Dulles brothers’ CIA covert operation 
seemed as a success at the time. Mossadegh was removed, and the Shah, who would align Iran 
interest with those of the United States, was placed back to power in Tehran. Restoring the 
Shah’s rule led to Iran becoming a client state of the United States, relying heavily on American 
support to stay in power. After the 1953 coup, the CIA (together with Israel’s intelligence agency 
Mossad) assisted the Shah in establishing SAVAK, a domestic security and intelligence force 
used by the Shah to suppress popular uprisings and hold on to power. SAVAK soon penetrated 
every layer of Iranian society, creating an atmosphere of fear and distrust among the Iranian 
population (Sadri, 2009).  
The twenty-six years of repression that followed the coup resulted in a powerful social 
idea that associates the Shah with foreign domination of Iran. The 1953 CIA coup against 
Mossadegh became a key event for the formation of an anti-hegemonic identity in the Iranian 
government, and now this anti-hegemonic identity determines how Iran behaves in the 
international arena (the discourse it adopts, the ideas it conceives, the interests it pursues).  
 This popular perception would determine the history of post-monarch Iran. It is from this 
time in Iranian history that the current national discourse of the Iranian government receives its 
inspiration. Ayatollah Khomeini would emerge from the post-coup period embracing an ideology 
that was fueled by mistrust of the West. He stated, “No state is truly independent unless it 
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confronts the hegemonic powers” (Sadri, 1999). All Iranian school children today know 1953 as 
the year when the United States carried out a covert violent operation to oppress Iran.  
Backlash against the United States’ interventions have had a significant impact on Iran’s 
official discourse and foreign policy goals. For example, speaking about Operation AJAX, 
Supreme Leader Khamenei expressed:  
The U.S. government has not yet lost its insatiable greed for 
domination of our country. They are still thinking of restoring their 
evil domination of Iran, which intensified with the coup on August 
19, 1953, and continued until the victory of the Islamic Revolution 
in 1979. They are still dreaming of the days when the head of state 
in this country, namely the corrupt and treacherous Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi, made no decisions until he consulted with U.S. 
officials” (Khamenei, 2002). 
 
 
With his message against U.S. political interventions in Iran, Ayatollah Ruholah 
Khomeini emerged as a political and spiritual opposition leader during the Shah’s oppressive era. 
His message resonated with the Iranian public, which had been harvesting a long repressed 
hatred for the Shah and his allies for his campaign to secularize Iran, dismissing Islam as a 
backward force, and bringing forth rapid social change and instability. Ayatollah Khomeini 
became a revered figure by multitudes of Iranian people (Christ, 2012).  
 
U.S. Unconditional Support for the Shah 
 
 
President Nixon continued U.S. support for the Shah in what was known as the twin 
pillar strategy, in which the Saudi and Iranian regimes were the most important strategic energy 
partners for the United States government (Christ, 2012). President Carter even forged a personal 
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friendship with the Shah. When they ushered in the New Year 1978 together at a party in the 
Niavaran palace in Tehran Carter stated, “Because of the great leadership of the Shah, Iran is an 
island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world… There is no leader with whom 
I have a deeper sense of personal gratitude and personal friendship,” (Armstrong, 1980). It is 
precisely because of continuous American support for the Shah, who was perceived as a puppet 
of the West and a tyrant, that the United States was widely seen as intrusive, exploitative, 
unilateralist, hypocritical, and engaging in what they label ‘financial imperialism’ and ‘cultural 
colonialism’ (Huntington, 1999). 
On January 7, 1978, an article published in a government newspaper ridiculed Ayatollah 
Khomeini, questioning his religious credentials and even his sexual preference. Khomeini’s 
supporters, in an extraordinary response, staged a series of massive demonstrations to demand 
the removal of the Shah. Troops were sent to restore social order and hundreds of Iranians were 
killed in Jaleh Square on a day that is remembered today as “Black Friday” (Abrahamian, 2008).  
Today’s Iranian leaders tell people that the suffering they endured at Jaleh Square was because 
of the doings of an evil Shah who was supported by the United States and Israel. This is 
significant because in many ways it is true, and it makes it easy to justify current Iranian anti-
hegemonic foreign policy.  
A few days after Black Friday, President Carter called the Shah and ensured continued 
American support. The Shah published the exchange verbatim in the newspapers, which angered 
the Iranian masses as they perceived it as though the United States stood behind a government 
that had just shot down thousands of unarmed civilians in Jaleh Square, fueling hatred of the 
Shah and its Washington enabler  (Christ, 2012).  
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The kind of discourse that gets triggered by the hegemon’s approach to a political 
situation abroad will yield the ideational context for future identities, interests, and foreign 
policies. When President Carter refused to accept the reality that Khomeini was the result of a 
salient grievance among the Iranian population, it then left the new Iranian leadership with no 
choice but to consider the United States’ government as an existential enemy. Hence, the United 
States lent the foundation for a social identity in Iran not only of itself (as revolutionaries) but 
also of the United States (as oppressors).  
As discontent for the Shah and his foreign allies grew and public support for Khomeini 
became more evident in Iran, the U.S. ambassador in Tehran, William Sullivan, advocated for 
the United States to engage in conversations with the Iranian opposition. In a memo titled 
"Thinking the Unthinkable," Sullivan expressed that the Shah's downfall was inevitable, and that 
a more moderate and democratic regime would replace his monarchy (The Jerusalem Post, 
2012). Sullivan observed that any post-Shah government would require Khomeini’s support to 
facilitate an orderly transfer of power to a new democratic government, and the sooner 
Washington recognized this the better for America’s standing in the future Iran (Christ, 2012). 
The U.S. Embassy had worked toward an arrangement between the Iranian military and 
the evident new regime, making a deal in which detailed understandings were reached between 
the armed forces and the revolutionary leaders for a transfer of allegiance. The plan was 
discussed with the Shah, and he approved. On the day of the meeting with Khomeini, the mission 
was cancelled (Lewis, 1980). Carter’s security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, viewed the issue 
mainly in realist terms of the Cold War and he preferred a military intervention to ensure a pro-
U.S. leader in Iran.  
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As the world’s superpower, the United States has a unique consequential effect on the 
future of another nation’s political identity. Cancellation of the mission must have given the 
Ayatollah no reason to believe Washington respected Iranian self-determination. The U.S. could 
have approached the situation differently on the leading moments to the Iranian revolution, but 
the most striking pattern is a disregard for the sentiments and perception of the Iranian people. It 
is as if the leadership of the United States at the time did not think that public discontent was 
significant at all. The Iranian revolution was brought forth by forcing the system to surrender 
through popular resistance.  
  President Carter sent a message to Khomeini asking him to support the government 
appointed by the Shah in order to prevent a military coup. Khomeini answered that the prime 
minister was not legitimate, and that the Iranian army is “in the hands of the Americans”, he 
continued, “if there is a coup, people will know that it is American and they will resist it” 
(Christ, 2012). This shows very clearly the Ayatollah’s emotional rejection of the idea of 
American influence inside Iran.  
After a year of intense public demonstrations, a parade of five prime ministers in less 
than a year, and the departure of the Shah from Iran, the Islamic Revolution brought Khomeini to 
power in February 1979. A BBC reporter in Tehran described the mass demonstrations in favor 
of Khomeini as being “extraordinary that one man can command such adoration, how so many 
people can believe that this old priest holds all the answers to Iran’s problems”. Undoubtedly, the 
people of Iran had a sense of hope that Khomeini was a just and intelligent man and that he 
wouldn’t betray Iran. These ideas were the product of the Shah’s dictatorship, which gave the 
masses the naïve notion that one person could reverse the massive social discontent. When 
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Khomeini arrived back to Iran from exile the welcoming was overwhelming; the army declared 
itself neutral to the political situation, and Khomeini appointed a new government, taking over 
the ministries, the armed forces, and the media.  
 
The 1979 Hostage Crisis 
 
Khomeini’s message of blaming America for everything that is wrong, coupled with the 
fact that President Carter gave the former Shah political asylum in the U.S. led Iranians to 
suspect that the U.S. was planning another 1953-style coup to return the Shah to the throne once 
more (Sadri, 2007). This suspicion peaked in November 1979 when a group of students stormed 
and took over the American Embassy in Tehran demanding the Shah’s extradition from the 
United States. Ayatollah Khomeini gave them his blessings. For Americans, the hostage crisis 
took an emotional toll, and it ultimately established the rhetoric and ideational context of Iran for 
a whole generation of Americans.  
 This moment marked the complete break in US-Iranian diplomatic relations, and it 
poisoned all future interactions until this day. A reporter asked President Carter at a news 
conference during the hostage crisis, "Mr. President, do you think it was proper for the United 
States to restore the Shah to the throne in 1953 against the popular will within Iran?" to which 
Carter replied "That's ancient history" (Kinzer, 2008). But this was the main reason that 
prompted the students to move on the American embassy in a day that in Iran is remembered as 
the Conquest of the American Spy Den.  For the Iranian leadership, the hostage crisis 
represented a demonstration of assertiveness and of taking control of Iran’s sovereignty and 
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independence from foreign actors. This single incident drove all moderates out from the 
revolutionary government, and it radicalized the Iranian regime in the eyes of the Americans. 
Later that month Khomeini assumed the position of Supreme Leader and the U.S. imposed 
economic sanctions on Iran banning its oil imports.  
After a series of deals in which the U.S. returned all frozen assets back to the Iranian 
government, and after a humiliating hold up at the airport to ensure the hostages would not be 
freed under Carter’s presidency, the hostages finally left Iran. The Iranian Hostage Crisis 
resulted in no deaths, and everyone was released as soon as President Reagan took office under 
the condition that the U.S. would never interfere with Iranian internal matters ever again (Sadri, 
2007). But it created the perception that Iran does not abide by international norms in the eyes of 
many in America.  
 
U.S. Support for Iraq During the Iraq-Iran War 
 
 
 The following year the U.S. established diplomatic relations with Iraq and, in Iran’s 
perception, gave Iraq the green light to invade Iran. President Ronald Reagan sent a special 
envoy, Donald Rumsfeld, to Baghdad to discuss ways the United States could help Saddam. In 
the wake of his visits, Washington provided Iraq with aid, including helicopters and satellite 
intelligence that was used in selecting bombing targets (Kinzer, 2008). It was clear to Iran that 
the West had not only allowed Saddam to break international law, but it had also armed Iraq to 
help him win. No one would sell weapons to Iran.  
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To witness the American support of a foreign aggression that cost it roughly 1 million 
lives created a greater anti-American feeling in Iran. Also, he U.S. provided chemical weapons to 
Iraq which it later used against Iran and that the United Nations failed to do something about 
Saddam’s use of such weapons was proof to Iranian leaders that the super powers were not to be 
trusted, for they will disregard international law like the Geneva Convention that condemns the 
use of chemical weapons, as long as they are used against independent minded states like Iran. 
The U.S. might have wanted Iraq to stop using chemical weapons, but at the same time it did not 
want Iran to win the war, so it decided to give it a blind eye (Schultz, 2009). The Iranian 
leadership felt as if they were not only fighting Saddam, but they we re fighting against the 
world. 
Aftermath 
 
The history between Iran and the United States has made each side view the other as an 
enemy rather than a rival state. Rivals exist in healthy competition like sport teams (perhaps how 
the U.S. sees China today). Enemies threaten one another because of who they are. Opposing 
worldviews make them mutually unacceptable, and they seek to convert or eliminate the other. A 
savage enemy is an indispensable part of the political identity of the Islamic Republic, thus, 
Iran’s foreign policy in dealing with the United States is based on a worldview of “good versus 
evil”. The idea is considered a mission of justice, freedom and truth against a “great Satan.” The 
discourse of enemy that resulted from the repeated intervention shows that Iran has deep mistrust 
of the outside world, especially the West. 
Iran’s constitution after the revolution makes negating hegemony and subjugation a 
national duty and part of the Iranian revolutionary identity. U.S. economic sanctions and past 
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endeavors in Iran could be the primary cause of extremism in the Iranian government, which 
since its beginnings feels vulnerable and exposed to super-powers. Anti-hegemony and non-
alignment serves as a defense mechanism to diminish their lesser capabilities. The Iranian 
leadership has adopted an anti-status quo discourse in its international relations as to resist the 
“domination” of the United States.  
Although debatable, Iranians perceive that the U.S. government has never sent clear 
signals that it intends to improve relations and play by the rules. The U.S. leadership is 
constantly calling for a regime change in Iran. Because of this, Iran’s leaders see the hard 
economic, military, and political sanctions as an outright aggression against the Iranian people, 
and will not change their behavior unless they see a meaningful intension from the leaders of the 
United States to ease the sanction assaults against their sovereignty.  
Today the relations between Iran and the United States are dominated by concerns over 
Iran’s nuclear program. The United States accuses Iran of trying to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction in spite of the fact that after the 1979 revolution, a clandestine, Shah era, nuclear 
weapons research program was disbanded by Khomeini through a public religious decree (fatwa) 
against the development, production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons which he 
considered forbidden under Muslim ethics and jurisprudence (Khamenei, 2010), and that 
Mohamed ElBaradei, the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said he had 
never “been able to find evidence that Iran has been weaponizing”, in terms of building nuclear-
weapons facilities and using enriched materials (Hersh, 2011). The intelligence community in the 
United States corroborates this. In a 2007 report, the CIA stated that Tehran “is less determined 
to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging” and that “some combination of threats 
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of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its 
security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived by Iran’s 
leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program” 
(NIE, 2007). 
The grievances expressed by the Iranian people all revolve around a perceived the lack of 
respect for their territorial dignity. Investigative journalist illustrates the complaints of the 
Iranian regime in an interview when he states: 
Cheney, the former vice president, was convinced there was a secret [nuclear] 
facility... He was convinced there was an underground facility somewhere. And 
we had Special Forces units in there since ’04, really, perhaps as late as ’05, 
looking. We’ve been paying off people—the Kurds, the Azeris, the opposition 
groups. We’ve been giving a lot of money to various defectors. We’ve been 
looking with satellites for telltale signs, air holes, air vents, somewhere in the 
desert or somewhere in an arid area. And we’ve found nothing, not for lack of 
trying. We looked very hard. And there’s just no evidence on the inside (Hersh, 
2011). 
 
The United States seems more preoccupied with Iran having nuclear capabilities and 
expertise than anything else. It was perhaps the U.S. unconcerned attitude towards the use of 
unconventional weapons against Iranian soldiers during the Iraq-Iran war that convinced Iranian 
leaders that they needed latent nuclear weapons capabilities. Latency is the possession of 
sophisticated scientific establishment and of nuclear energy infrastructure, which would allow 
the production of an atomic bomb on short notice if an extreme danger to national autonomy 
seemed imminent (Cole, 2009). But to pressure Iran to give up its nuclear program and 
"surrender" might, in reality, make Iran more determined to develop its nuclear program, which 
it currently insists has exclusively peaceful civilian purposes. 
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Iran faces cyber attacks, scientist assassinations, and sanctions on medicine and foodstuff 
from outside actors. Because of this, Iranians feel they cannot give anything in the negotiating 
table in order to avoid looking weak. Iran’s Supreme Leader has stated, “Rights cannot be 
achieved by entreating. If you supplicate, withdraw and show flexibility, arrogant powers will 
make their threat more serious” (Sadjadpour, 2008).  
Because the United States sees Iran as an existential enemy, it is determined to prevent it 
from becoming a real threat. The method employed by the U.S. to prevent Iran from acquiring 
nuclear capabilities is rough economic sanctions, and indeed, the Iranian economy is feeling the 
pain. But the economic problems caused by the sanctions might prove to be counterproductive at 
achieving Washington’s goal of weakening the Islamic regime. Under the sanctions, to import 
anything merchants have to be aligned with the regime because it will have to be smuggled, 
which is very difficult without government involvement. Their basic effect has been to weaken 
civil society and strengthen the state — the opposite of what we should be trying to do in that 
country (Zakaria, 2011). Perhaps the most regrettable effect the sanctions could have is making 
people develop deep resentment and discontent towards Western nations for strangling their 
economy and for hurting them more than the regime.  
An Iranian diplomat in Caracas told me that the issue between Iran and the United States 
is not its nuclear program, but that it is the United States anxiety over an independent state like 
Iran reaching its full capacities (Nikahd, 2012). He refers to the U.S. preoccupation with what 
the CIA report that stated, “We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical 
and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so” (NIE, 
2007). This diplomat expressed his confidence that it is the United States most important foreign 
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policy goal to ensure that no challenger to American predominance shall emerge in the world. 
Iran has all the requirements to become a formidable deterrence for the U.S. in the Middle East, 
and a hegemon would never tolerate deterrence.  
The main obstacle for improvement is that the U.S. does not try to understand the 
government and society that have emerged in Iran since the Islamic revolution. U.S. policy 
makers are in the dark about Tehran’s true intentions, and thus they assume the worst (Sadri, 
2007). A policy that is meant to bring the Iranian regime to its knees and beg for forgiveness is 
precisely what makes Iranian leaders hang on and resist. They will not tolerate a move that 
embarrasses them or undermines Iran’s dignity and honor. If U.S. leaders were to deal directly 
and respectfully with Iran, they would be more likely to understand the justifications for Iran’s 
resistance policies and could then work toward a solution based on mutual understanding.  
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Chapter 2: USA-Venezuela 
 
Venezuela and the United States have had stable bilateral relations regardless of geo-
political disagreements. Venezuela has historically been able to combine its alliance with the 
United States with positions like being a founding member of OPEC, among others. Since 
refineries on the U.S. Gulf Coast are specifically designed to handle heavy Venezuelan crude, 
Venezuela was the third-largest exporter of petroleum products to the United States from 2002 
through 2009, hence the Venezuelan economy is deeply interconnected to the United States and 
international oil markets (EIA, 2012). U.S. goods account for 25% of Venezuela’s imports, and 
60% of its exports go to the United States (Bonfili, 2010).  
But since the turn of the century this tradition of close ties, commerce, and investment 
has been overshadowed by political animosity since the Venezuelan government adopted an 
emancipatory attitude towards the United States. To understand how the Venezuela-U.S. 
relations went from partnership to a national security concern, it is necessary to discuss the 
worldview of president Hugo Chavez and the normative narrative of his Bolivarian Revolution.  
Chavez was perhaps best known for his offensive foreign policy and his posture against 
the United States. As in the case of Iran, a revolutionary government that portrays the United 
States as an exploitative imperial power has taken control through a popular movement in 
Venezuela. Since then, Chávez focused his foreign policy to repel U.S. influence from Latin 
America, assert his worldview in the region, and show that developing countries are better off 
independent of Washington’s wishes. The chavista ideology is a mixture of ideals; on 
international affairs, Chavez draws his inspiration from Simon Bolivar, the Venezuelan military 
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and political leader who led the independence movement against the Spanish Empire in the 19th 
century. Chavez managed to successfully associate Bolivar’s struggle against colonialism with 
his own struggle against exploitative foreign imperialists and neo-liberals.  
Domestically, Chavez exhibited Castro-style populism; he established a series of social 
welfare programs he called “missions” implemented with extensive Cuban expertise. Chavismo 
promotes a combative stance against what Chavez refers to as “the savage capitalism that 
Washington intends to impose on [Latin America]” (Chavez, 2013).  
 
Historical Backdrop 
 
There are four events in Venezuelan history that are referred to often by the Venezuelan 
government to justify its international behavior. First, the riots and killings known as the 
caracazo of 1989; a series of protests and lootings that culminated in a massacre by the hands of 
national security forces, popularly perceived as catering to international financial institutions. 
Second, the 1992 failed coup d’état that followed the caracazo riots and catapulted then 
Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chavez to the national spotlight. Third, the 1998 landslide presidential 
election of Hugo Chavez, and finally, the 2002 coup attempt against President Chavez by pro-
business elites who were allegedly supported by the Bush administration. These four historical 
moments represent the moral justifications in the chavista official narrative for their angst against 
free market economic policies, the United States foreign policy towards Latin America, and for 
the current anti-imperialist foreign policy of Venezuela.  
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Latin America's search for identity has been profoundly entangled with its relationship 
with the United States. Resistance to the U.S. is an integral part of national self-assertion in Latin 
America. As early as the early nineteenth century, the U.S. President James Monroe stated: “we 
should consider any attempt on [foreign entities] to extend their system to any portion of this 
hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.” With what came to be known as the “Monroe 
Doctrine,” President Monroe adopted a dominant role over the entire American continent, and 
laid down the mental outlook for United States’ foreign policy in the region for centuries to 
come, turning hemispheric domination into full-fledged foreign policy (Erikson, 2008).  
By the end of the nineteenth century, vast oil reserves were discovered in Venezuela, 
turning it into a strategic market for U.S. oil companies, and the American model became the 
foundation for the private economy of Venezuela (McManus, 2003). Since the 1960s 
Washington gave its full support to anti-communist regimes, often welcoming right-wing 
military governments in spite of popular discontent. For Chavez supporters, U.S. imperialism 
concentrated on the establishment and preservation of spheres of influence in Latin America as 
to extend control through informal means of economic and political relations. This way it would 
be possible to obtain the benefits of imperialism at a minimum cost. Many in Venezuela are 
quick to point out that interventions by the U.S. in Latin America have consistently been 
intended to legitimize the acceptance of a dominant status quo.   
The Caracazo 
 
Turbulent social events can generate drastic and antagonist changes that manifest in 
norms and customs of society, affecting its identity (Mirabal, 1996). The caracazo marked the 
beginning of a social process that produced the anti-American discourse that currently drives 
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Venezuelan foreign policy. By the late 1980s the Venezuela government was going through an 
economic crisis due to a steady decline in the international oil prices. The International Monetary 
Fund (perceived as an extension of the United States government by most Venezuelans) 
encouraged the Venezuelan government to execute various measures in order to secure billions 
of dollars in loans. These measures included public austerity, the elimination of subsidies, 
freezing of salaries, and raising prices of fuels by 100% overnight.   
These measures were extremely unpopular in Venezuela, especially among the urban 
poor who saw the economic reforms as unfairly trying to resolve the state’s fiscal crisis by 
placing the burden onto the poor people (Lindsay, 2012). Venezuela’s poor experienced 
considerable rage against the Washington inspired structural reforms on the one hand, but 
inability to mobilize this anger constructively on the other hand (Kohli, 2009). On February 27th, 
1989, massive protests erupted all over Caracas among the urban poor to protest the 
liberalization package.  
It was the way that the Venezuelan government decided to react to the protests that would 
set a national discourse into motion for years to come. The armed forces were called in by 
President Perez to control the situation and to repress acts of violence. Official figures cite less 
than 300 deaths, but this numbers were invalidated by the appearance of mass graves (Inter-
American Court, 1999). Some estimate the number of casualties in the thousands (Robertson, 
2011). Young inexperienced soldiers fired at unarmed civilians, many executed at close range, in 
an attempt to stop the social upheaval (Ciccariello, 2012).  
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President Perez suspended basic constitutional guarantees including individual freedom, 
right to immunity of domicile, freedom of movement, freedom of expression, right of assembly, 
and right to take part in peaceful manifestations; a nationwide 6pm-to-6am curfew was imposed 
and hundreds of arrests were reported (Inter-American Court, 1999). Many perceived that the 
Venezuelan government’s main objective was to guarantee the social stability that is so precious 
to international investors, and the political elite and the media portrayed the killings as a 
“necessary measure to safeguard the social order in a period of neoliberal restructuring” 
(Coronil, 2011).  
Perhaps for a lack of a better scapegoat, Chavez’s government portrays the events of the 
caracazo as a fight against the Washington Consensus. Officials turned the massacre into an 
emotionally charged historical moment, like the way Americans think of the Boston Tea-party. 
Chavez said:  
The day came when the fields and streets were filled with blood 
and courage! When the Venezuelan people gave an example of 
historical awareness, said no to the International Monetary Fund 
and neo-liberalism, and took to the streets on 27 February 1989! 
Long live the martyrs of the people! (BBC, 2005). 
 
Chavez supporters consider the events of February 27th, 1989 as the 
foundation of the Bolivarian Revolution. It gave conspiring members of the armed 
forces the necessary assurance they needed to take arms against what they 
described as a “murderous regime”. 
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The 1992 coup 
 
 It was under this social-political environment that Hugo Chavez and other military 
officers carried out their plan to overthrow the government of Carlos Andres Perez on February 
4th, 1992.  Chavez mentioned that his military movement sprang up as a reaction to the US-led 
overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende, but he added that the caracazo was a defining 
event in the establishment of a revolutionary identity among many Venezuelans. Chavez 
explained: 
[The caracazo was] the trigger that marked the start of the offensive 
because the Venezuelan people were saying no to neo-liberalism 
and we soldiers had been the armed force of the IMF (referring to 
the caracazo massacre)… If imperialists ever mess with Venezuela, 
they will have to face the people of Bolivar who will be willing to 
defend their sovereignty and dignity! (BBC, 2005).  
 
 Today the Chavez’ regime celebrates February 4th as a national holiday called “Day of 
National Dignity” in which the failed coup attempt is described to the population as a struggle 
for liberation. This is the type of discourse that has become the context for the international 
identity of Venezuela. 
The Chavez-led coup failed to take control of the government, and he and many of his 
men were arrested. But it was successful at turning Hugo Chavez into a national hero; many saw 
him as someone who was willing to stand up to a corrupt and dysfunctional political system. His 
popularity was so high that presidential candidates in 1994 promised to release the coup plotters 
as a campaign promise. After spending two years in prison, Chavez was pardoned by incoming 
president Rafael Caldera in 1994 (Carlson, 2013).  
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The Elections of 1998 
The dialectic dynamic between history and social forces can transform societies, 
sometimes radically, resulting in the opposite behavior of what it had traditionally been (Mirabal, 
1996). The coup attempt forced Venezuelan people to undergo a deep reflection, and to desire 
political rectification. Popular masses and political groups felt excluded in the early 1990’s and 
had no enthusiasm for the defense of institutions and constitutional order. People, feeling that 
their politicians had failed them and that democracy and freedom were not securing them access 
to food and shelter, were craving a different message; one that would address the causes of the 
caracazo and the military uprising.  
Chavez embodied the sentiment that democracy cannot exist if people are not eating, and 
that Latin American democracies have to rethink their partnership with international financial 
cartels.  He enjoyed impressive popular support, and he ran for the Venezuelan presidency on a 
platform that looked for viable alternatives that were more responsive to local conditions in the 
economic, social, and political spheres than the one-size-fits-all model of market-oriented liberal 
democracy (Cannon, 2011). Chavez appealed to the population by successfully associating 
foreign bankers with the colonial oppressors of the past. Like Simon Bolivar had promised to 
throw out the imperial masters, Chavez promised to throw out the neo-liberal international 
capitalists with their economic packages and one-sided trading propositions. Chavez’s populist 
message appealed to the working classes and an electoral coalition with leftist elements proved 
unstoppable; he won in landslide in 1998 (Sylvia & Danopoulos, 2003). 
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The 2002 Coup 
 Oil was key for Chavez to be able to re-distribute Venezuela's wealth and finance the social 
reforms he had in mind for the country. Energy interests had historically driven the relations 
between the U.S. and Venezuela, and Chavez had been the only president in Venezuela’s history 
to pursue far-reaching changes at home that would support a truly independent economic policy. 
These reforms included a new hydrocarbons law that declared the oil industry under the domain 
of the Venezuelan government, and increased royalties paid by foreign corporations from 16.6% 
to 30% in a move to redirect more petroleum earnings to address Venezuela’s social needs 
(Kozloff, 2006).  
 In the same fashion of Prime Minister Mossadegh, the hydrocarbons reform was a direct 
blow against economic elites and American interests in the region. The hydrocarbons law was 
portrayed by the government as a step to re-connect the nation’s wealth with the social 
development of Venezuela. Tapping into collective frustration and perceived opportunism by 
trans-national companies, the hydrocarbons reform was seen as a patriotic wish to advance, to 
progress, and some called it a second independence. 
  In the United States, relations with Venezuela are usually framed in the context of 
highlighting the vulnerability of energy dependence on foreign (rather hostile) suppliers.  
Because of this, the United States' anxiety about Hugo Chavez's radical populist government 
revolves around the concern that it might become uncooperative, or inefficient at keeping up 
with oil production. Hugo Chavez quickly became a hated figure among the United States 
government and Venezuelan wealthy population (Gunson, 2001). His demonization of banks, 
crack down on the media, anti-status quo rhetoric, and manipulation of his political base with 
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generous handouts, fomented a desire to remove Chavez and his popular movement from office 
among factions wanting to regain political control of Venezuelan natural resources.  
 On April 11, 2002, opposition leaders organized a massive demonstration with a message 
that quickly evolved from protesting Chavez’s hydrocarbons reforms to demanding the 
president’s resignation. Later that day, 19 people were shot dead and the opposition media 
outlets blamed government forces for the killings. Major civilian figures insisted that it was no 
longer possible to tolerate a government that supposedly had soiled its hands with the blood of 
the people.  In the early morning hours of Friday, April 12th, President Chavez was arrested and 
replaced by Pedro Carmona, the head of Venezuela’s business confederation and widely 
perceived as being friendly to U.S. interests. The coup plotters proceeded to annul the 
constitution, and dissolve all public bodies (Sylvia & Danopoulos, 2003). 
While all other hemispheric leaders were condemning the interim government in 
Venezuela, Bush administration Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, stated that Chavez had provoked 
his own downfall for having attacked protesters. "We know that the action encouraged by the 
Chavez government provoked this crisis," Fleischer said. "According to the best information 
available, the Chavez government suppressed peaceful demonstrations and fired on unarmed, 
peaceful protesters” (Fleischer, 2002).  
It was later proved that the images used to justify the arrest of President Chavez were 
manipulated to make believe that government forces were firing at protesters. Another video 
taken at exactly the same time surfaced, showing Metropolitan Police officers on foot and from 
armored vehicles shooting at the chavistas while they fired back (Coronil, 2011). There was an 
immediate rejection of Carmona and massive spontaneous protests and sectors of the army 
  34 
returned Chavez to power on April 13th. 
As business groups were threatening the Chavez presidency, the United States 
government was financing factions within these groups (Marquis, 2002). The U.S. Department of 
State stated, “It is clear that National Endowment for Democracy, Department of Defense, and 
other U.S. assistance programs provided training, institution building, and other support to 
individuals and organizations understood to be actively involved in the brief ouster of the Chavez 
government” (2002). The permissive attitude by the United States to what was perceived as an 
undemocratic interim government gave Chavez supporters the impression that the United States 
had at least tolerated or encouraged the 2002 coup. The Central Intelligence Agency was aware 
that dissident military officers and opposition figures in Venezuela were planning a coup against 
President Hugo Chávez. But immediately after the overthrow, the Bush administration blamed 
Mr. Chávez for his own downfall and denied knowing about the threats (Forero, 2004).   
Today, the Venezuelan government depicts the 2002 coup as an illegal action by the 
Chamber of Commerce, the private media, and the American embassy. This illegal action is 
explained as being defeated by the hard work of patriotic warriors that remained loyal to the 
defense of national sovereignty, integrity, and dignity. He used this event to turn PDVSA into a 
personal, unchecked, branch of his government. And to prevent any other major challenge, he 
staffed the government and the armed forces based on loyalty (or lack of will) rather than merit 
and character, and he surrounded himself with Cuban security.  After the 2002 coup Chavez 
began to portray the United States as a dangerous enemy to Venezuela; one that would take any 
opportunity to regain its influence over Venezuelan national resources. Some believed that 
President Bush was not concerned with promoting democracy in Venezuela, but with merely 
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getting rid of Chavez through very illiberal means (Cole, 2007). 
Today Venezuela is suffering a mismanagement of its economy and social institutions. 
Corruptions is among the worst in the world, ranking 165 out of 176 (Transparency International, 
2010), crime is perhaps the most cited concern among the urban population, and the harassment 
and exclusion of non-chavistas is quite shameless. Venezuelans may come to realize that Chavez 
wasted a colossal opportunity to endow their country with the necessary infrastructure for 
sustained development and the best social services, but as of now, it seems this lesson has not 
been learned (The Economist, 2013). 
 
Aftermath 
Historically, Venezuela has always exhibited international activism based on the belief 
that the Venezuelan model ought to be imitated by other countries in the world. “Follow the 
example given by Caracas” are lyrics of the Venezuelan National Anthem. Simon Bolivar 
thought so when he initiated his military campaigns outside of Venezuela. The Chavista project 
is no different, as government officials in Caracas equate it with a revolutionary mission of 
global scale (Romero, 2006). The institutionalized historical context of Venezuela’s worldview 
as explained by the chavista interpretation, turned Venezuela’s foreign service into a branch of 
Mr. Chavez’s revolution, and redefined the strategic perception of what is “good” for Venezuela.  
Today Venezuelan’s foreign policy is shaped by a belief that the U.S. seeks to dominate 
Latin America’s national economies, and because of this, independence from U.S. markets has 
been made a rather unrealistic priority. The new anti-imperialist identity of the Venezuelan 
government has transformed its foreign interests into advocating the creation of an international 
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coalition to reduce U.S. influence in the region. Hugo Chavez pioneered the creation of regional 
organizations that will increase Venezuela’s voice in the Western Hemisphere and advocate a 
multipolar world-order to alleviate the “predatory effects” of neoliberal trade policies “imposed 
by US hegemony” on weaker countries (Dodson and Dorraj, 2008).  Some examples of these 
organizations include ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America), which 
envisions becoming an alternative to the IMF and World Bank for the region, focusing mainly on 
economic aid, social welfare, poverty reduction, bartering, and overall integration.  
Another example is PetroCaribe, an international social program that provides discounted 
oil and wide reaching social components to poor Caribbean nations.  Venezuela also promoted 
the creation of a multistate oil company formed by the national oil companies of Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, and Venezuela named PetroSur , and the creation of TeleSUR, a pan-Latin 
American TV channel, meant to counter channels like CNN and to promote the integration of 
Latin American countries (Smith, 2004). 
Although Chavez dealt with plenty of opposition, he enjoyed a strong body of support 
domestically. Some people I met in Venezuela have adopted the official line so religiously that 
their personal identity is based first around the fact that they are chavistas; they see Hugo Chavez 
as an extension of themselves. His message managed to persuade the biggest population in the 
country, the poorest people, including the slum population, to embrace his interpretation of 
history. They not only supported Hugo Chavez but they also adored him. Being chavista is not 
just a political view that one can be talked out of, but it is a life-style. I had to be tactful and 
relaxed about sharing my thoughts of what “could be better” about some of Chavez’s policies, 
because supporters might take government criticism personal and offensive.  
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As I write this paper news broke out that Hugo Chavez lost his battle against cancer. The 
Venezuelan government’s identity is based so heavily on Chavez’s worldview that it is to be 
seen what shape will it take after his death. Nicolas Maduro, the defacto president of Venezuela 
after Chavez’s death, does not have the authority and charisma Chavez did. Now that the 
elections of 2012 are over, the Venezuelan economy is in trouble. Shortages of commonly used 
products are widespread as well as shortages of foreign currencies. There is a rationing system in 
place to control foreign exchange, and Maduro already devalued the Venezuelan Bolivar by 32% 
in February (The Economist, 2013). Politically, the only thing Maduro has in his favor is that 
Chavez anointed him as the successor, and his political message seems to consist on securing a 
sympathy vote from Chavez supporters. 
It is to be seen how Chavez’s death will affect Venezuela’s international relations with 
the United States and with Iran. Upon news of Chavez’s death president Ahmadinejad said, 
"Hugo Chavez is a name known to all nations. His name is a reminder of cleanliness and 
kindness, bravery...dedication, and tireless efforts to serve the people, especially the poor and 
those scarred by colonialism and imperialism" (George, 2013). His words exemplify the tenants 
on which Iran and Venezuela’s relations are based: personal friendship of leaders and a 
commitment to anti-hegemony. Obama said, “At this challenging time of President Hugo 
Chavez’s passing the United States reaffirms its support for the Venezuelan people and its 
interest in developing a constructive relationship with the Venezuelan government" (Alpert, 
2013); his message also shows the nature of the relations between the U.S. and Venezuela, which 
is more based on mutual interests than in solidarity or friendship.  
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It is now that the U.S. must play its cards in a way that it could regain some of its lost 
influence in the region and become a good productive partner for all countries in Latin America. 
Given the significant power of national discourse on shaping the foreign behavior of nations, 
engaging in the right type of diplomacy could set in motion a pattern of behavior that will prove 
to be extremely beneficial to the United States and the region. 
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Chapter 3: Iran-Venezuela  
 
The phrase “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” has been used to describe alliances 
that are rooted in cooperation against a shared adversary. It is evident that the Iran-Venezuela 
alliance is not a coincidence and that it is knit together by distrust for United States foreign 
policies and a desire to boost south-to-south cooperation and alliances, as to free themselves 
from the influences of the United States (Dorraj, 2010).  The political and economic alliance 
between Iran and Venezuela could be understood as different manifestations of the same 
phenomena.  A perception of American foreign policy as egotistic, and solely interested on 
controlling natural resources has birthed a two headed monster: two revolutionary governments 
that promote an anti-imperialist ideology from which their international interests and anti-
hegemonic identities have been defined.  
Both Iran and Venezuela try restlessly to infuse a certain narrative into the everyday 
vocabulary of their people. Anti-hegemony, resistance, anti-colonialism, and anti-imperialism, 
are concepts that both governments embrace passionately and they encourage their populations 
to do the same. From this discourse is that the ideas and values that drive Venezuela and Iran’s 
international behavior spring from. Chavez and Ahmadinejad shared anti-hegemony as their 
ideological backbone of their foreign policy. They see each other as fellow revolutionaries on the 
same side of a geopolitical struggle against an international status quo of core and periphery 
countries. This kind of rhetoric seems to be one of most unifying features of the relationship 
between the two nations, from which they created a “cozy financial, political, and [to a lesser 
degree] military partnership rooted in anti-American animus” (Morgenthau, 2009). 
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In my conversation with an Iranian diplomat in Caracas, he made a comparison between 
the relations of Venezuela and both the United States and Iran. He said, “the relations between 
Iran and Venezuela are based on mutual respect and trust, they exemplify solidarity and a desire 
for cooperation and sovereignty is always honored.” He added, “relations between Venezuela 
and the United States are based on interests (mineral fuels and oil) and on domination (exercising 
hegemony)… the United States has a complete disregard for the democratic character of the 
Venezuelan revolution and would gladly intervene in Venezuela domestic affairs” (Nikahd, 
2012). His comment is the perfect example of the official pitch in Venezuela concerning the 
increasing Iranian presence. Iran has doubled its embassies and cultural centers in Latin America 
since 2005, but nowhere has Iran’s search for allies been more fruitful than in Venezuela, where 
by far the highest Iranian presence is exhibited in the region today (Morgan, 2010).   
There has been increasing anxiety in Washington about Iran’s foreign policy towards 
Venezuela, and the warm welcome exhibited by some Latin American countries to Iranian 
diplomats. There are two narratives in the United States concerning the Iran- Venezuela 
friendship. One that sees it as an “axis of annoyance” which main goal is to generate angst 
against Washington (Pressly, 2009). The other sees the sudden increase of Iran’s relations in 
Latin America as a “hostile provocations” in the Western Hemisphere that must be confronted 
(U.S. Congress, 2012). But since the force driving their sudden closeness is a perception of the 
U.S. as being interventionist, the manner in which the United States responds [or not] to their 
growing ties will have a critical effect on the dynamics between Iran and Venezuela. 
Overreacting could easily set into motion a discourse that could deepen anti-American 
sentiments in both regions.  
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Because of past CIA ventures in places like Guatemala, Cuba, and Chile, as well as in 
Iran, the United States has gained a reputation in Latin America and the Middle East of 
patronizing repressive governments that represented American interests. Accusations blaming 
the U.S. of smothering popular movements created resentment towards foreign interference, 
which is exploited daily by politicians in both Iran and Venezuela. The sudden surge of 
diplomatic activity between Iran and Venezuela is caused by a mutual understanding of being on 
the same side of a geopolitical struggle against oppressive super-powers. They see the fight for a 
more plural and just world as their constitutional duty and moral crusade, and so they push an 
anti-American message on their constituencies so hey can pursue a revolutionary alternative to 
what they see as American imperialism.  
This is all happening at a time when there is a popular notion in Latin America that the 
United States does not care about the region, and as a consequence American influence has 
probably never been lower than now (Associated Press, 2008). This marked an opportunity for 
Iran to build up its influence and a foothold in a region that Washington has always regarded as 
its own backyard. The Ahmadinejad administration saw the growing anti-US sentiments in Latin 
America as a strategic opportunity to embark in a diplomatic offensive there. It is unprecedented 
for a Middle Eastern nation to try to gather so much goodwill from Latin America, which makes 
one wonder what kind of political results are expected by the Islamic nation. Perhaps, in its 
efforts to defuse worsening economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures imposed by the United 
States, Venezuela became a top priority for Iranian diplomats. As sanctions get more severe and 
multilateral, we should expect to see Iran reach out more frequently to Venezuela and others in 
Latin America for political aid (Johnson, 2012).  
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Iran hopes that these peripheral partnerships could amount to a serious and meaningful 
political force against hostile U.S. measures. Chavez was drawn by Iranian appeals of resistance 
against what he perceived as the “arrogance” of the United States, and by Iranian promises of 
economic cooperation in areas like construction, agriculture, and industry, particularly in the 
energy sector (Cordesman, 2012).  He saw Iran as a country that managed to achieve high levels 
of technological development independently, which Venezuela could possibly emulate. 
The history of interactions between Iran and Venezuela is not very eventful; the 
tantalizing feature that links Iran and Venezuela is exclusively their geopolitical stance. The 
governments of Iran and Venezuela have perpetuated the belief that the United States’ sole 
objective is to dominate weaker countries. To defend their national identity and independence in 
a world ruled by stronger states, they understand foreign policy as the internationalization of the 
interests of less developed countries, with an agenda of dominating international meetings, 
conferences, and organizations with their common economic, political, and social problems 
(Sadri, 1999).   
 From the American perspective, any type of joint activities from “enemy states” is good 
enough reason to keep a close watch and possibly react. Although senior State Department and 
intelligence officials have indicated there is no real threat in the relations between Iran and 
Venezuela, Washington has stated that it is “closely monitoring Tehran’s activities in Latin 
America” (Baroud, 2013).  
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Historical Backdrop 
It is important to acknowledge that Ahmadinejad himself did not initiate relations 
between Iran and Latin America. Iran exchanged diplomatic representatives with Mexico in 
1889. Argentina and Brazil initiated relations with Iran in 1902 and 1903, respectively. Relations 
between Iran and Venezuela date to the 1940s. Back then, both countries were struggling to 
achieve better treatment from foreign oil companies, and thus, were among the founders of the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. It was the Shah of Iran who 
opened embassies in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela, implementing his non-aligned National 
Independent Foreign Policy (Johnson, 2012). The Islamic Revolution of 1979 [which had 
profound similarities with leftist ideologies, especially in regards to defending the oppressed] led 
to warm relations with Cuba during the 1980s, and with Nicaragua under the Sandinistas 
(Johnson, 2012). Commerce with Argentina picked up as Iran stopped buying wheat from the 
United States. Iran then looked to Brazil for help setting up industries, resulting in teams visiting 
Iran to discuss supplying equipment for power plants (Johnson, 2012).   
President Khatami (1997-2005) pioneered the most recent surge of Iranian activity in 
Latin America, most notably with Venezuela. A strategy that would increase political ties and 
develop an outlet for Iranian exports started with bilateral economic and industrial cooperation 
commission established in 2001 (El Universal, 2001). In 2003 an agreement was signed by Iran 
and Venezuela to set up a joint venture for the production of tractors in Venezuela using Iranian 
technology and know-how. Then President Khatami and President Chavez inaugurated the 
manufacturing plant on March 2005. Referring to this joint venture in his inauguration speech, 
Khatami said that this plant was a small affair for a great country such as Venezuela, but it could 
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be considered as a good starting point (Arabbaghi, 2005). That year, Iran signed its first-ever free 
trade agreement with Venezuela. 
Under Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Iran’s foreign policy resembles an “eye for an eye” 
type of logic, suggesting that Iran should move aggressively into the United States’ own 
backyard to actively retaliate against the US attempts to become the most powerful entity in the 
Middle East (Iran’s backyard), and its desire to isolate Iran economically and diplomatically 
(Farhi, 2010).  
Meanwhile, a populist turn in Latin America gave Ahmadinejad an opportunity to pursue 
an active foreign policy. The recent push for cooperation started in 2005 with projects meant to 
create economic links between the two nations. Venezuela's state-owned oil company, Petroleos 
de Venezuela SA (PDVSA), signed a deal with Iran's state company Petropars to explore oil 
deposits in Venezuela's Orinoco River basin. The study will form the basis of future joint 
ventures to extract crude in which the Venezuelan government would have a 51 percent stake. 
By September 2006 PDVSA and Petropars had begun drilling in the block (Business News 
Americas, 2006).  
Also in 2006 Iran announced it anticipated $4 billion investment in Venezuelan oilfields 
and an agreement to help explore Venezuela’s offshore gas blocks (Bodzin, 2007). Another joint 
project intended to strengthen ties materialized when Chavez and Ahmadinejad inaugurated the 
construction of a petrochemical plant in southern Iran (Nasseri, 2007). Both leaders revealed 
plans to open a $1 billion joint petroleum trading international company like Chevron or Shell, to 
be named the Venezuelan-Iranian Oil and Gas Company, or VENIROGC. The company is meant 
to deal in the international oil and gas markets along the entire value chain, from production to 
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gas stations. This company will mainly focus on activities outside both countries such as oil 
activities in Bolivia and Syria (BBC Worldwide, 2007). 
 Soon after their oil companies started to cooperate, other projects were executed. The 
Venirauto automobile-manufacturing project was established west of Caracas with a $99 million 
investment to produce subsidized cars to be sold for much less than imports. The project had 
good intensions, including to generate value added output that would contribute to Venezuela’s 
GNP and saving its currency spending by achieving local production of parts. The Iranian 
ambassador, Abdolah Zifan, said that he hoped these manufacturing plans could be seen as "an 
answer to the negative campaigns against [Iran]…We hope the production of this factory gets out 
to the whole nation and we hope to see the completion of other projects between the two 
countries" (Carlson, 2007). But the company has been struggling from its beginnings and could 
be forced to closed down due to financial problems (Correo del Caroni, 2008). 
 Also in 2007, the two countries revealed plans for a joint $2 billion fund to finance 
investments for projects in friendly countries throughout the developing world. This move is one 
of the best examples of the political nature of the relationship between Iran and Venezuela. 
Chavez said the move "will permit us to underpin investments in those countries whose 
governments are making efforts to liberate themselves from the imperialist yoke…This fund, my 
brother will become a mechanism for liberation" (Pearson, 2007). Iran later announced plans to 
use Bolivia as a base to expand Iran’s Red Crescent medical programs in South America, 
beginning with two low-cost health clinics (Fars news, 2008). It jointly funded a hospital with 
Venezuela worth $2.5 million in El Alto, a barrio outside La Paz (Coster, 2010).  
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In 2009 Oil ministers Masoud Mirkazemi and Rafael Ramírez signed agreements, 
including a pact by which Venezuela would provide Iran with refined gasoline in case of 
shortages caused by economic sanctions. According to the deal, Iran will daily import 20,000 
barrels of gasoline, worth $800 million, from Venezuela as of October. Venezuela will import 
technology and machinery from Iran in exchange for the export-bound gasoline. Also in the deal 
PDVSA would invest $760 million in South Pars gas field (Camacho, 2009). 
 By announcing this, Chavez was sending a clear message to the international community 
that he is standing by Iran in its struggle for independence. By 2010 VENIROGC’s first priority 
became setting up a 140,000 barrel-per- day oil refinery in Syria. Venezuela would have a 33 
percent stake, while Iran would control 26 percent. The rest of the shares would be divided 
between Syria and Malaysia. Half of the feedstock would come from Iran and Venezuela, while 
the rest would be supplied by Syria.  
It is evident that the growing ties between Iran and Venezuela got a lot of people worried, 
to the point of allowing their imagination to run wild. In 2011, the U.S.-based Spanish-language 
network Univision aired an investigative documentary alleging that Venezuelan and Iranian 
diplomats were interested in an offer from a group of Mexican hackers to infiltrate the websites 
of the White House, FBI, Pentagon and U.S. nuclear sites. However, State Department 
spokesman Mark Toner said about the allegations, "we don't have any information at this point to 
corroborate it" (Castillo, 2011). The popularity of this program shows that there is a degree of 
preoccupation about Iran’s ties with Venezuela, to the point that people would believe almost 
anything that portrays their relationship as threat. The German newspaper Die Welt joined the 
paranoia when it reported that a group of engineers from an Iranian Revolutionary Guard were 
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commissioned to building a missile base in Venezuela. The State Department stated that after 
reviewing all the information pertaining to Iranian military activities in the hemisphere, it could 
not verify the report. The department stated, "we have no evidence to support this claim and 
therefore no reason to believe the assertions made in the article are credible" (del Rincon, 2011). 
The alliance between Tehran and Caracas is significant more for its symbolism than for 
its material threat. Most of the historical episodes between these two countries are nothing more 
than attempts to make a political point rather than to pose a military threat of any sort. The 
relations have not been dramatic enough to generate a lasting discourse among the population 
that could transcend through time. Given that the alliance is centered on both presidents, it is not 
clear at the moment whether Iran will continue to enjoy its close association with Venezuela now 
that Chavez lost his battle against cancer and an opposition candidate could take over the 
Venezuelan presidency. The projects did virtually nothing to create enduring institutions for 
broad-based, long-term economic and social development (Shifter, 2013).   
 
Aftermath 
Chavez and Ahmadinejad’s mutual cooperation has been beneficial to both their causes; 
domestically, their brotherly display of solidarity is portrayed as international support for their 
policies. Internationally, they stand united by a shared political stance that calls for a power 
balance in the world against neo-colonialism. Both presidents have embraced a message 
emphasizing autonomy and independence from great powers, citing unity in the struggle against 
capitalism. Ahmadinejad stated, "new orders should be established in the world… Iran, Brazil 
and Venezuela in particular can have determining roles in designing and establishing these new 
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orders" (Kraul, 2009). Chavez has whole-heartedly advocated third world comradeship, 
encouraging other developing countries to reduce dependence on “the empire” by diversifying 
foreign relations away from the US. In a speech at the Tehran University, Hugo Chavez told 
students, “We have to save humankind and put an end to the U.S. Empire” (El Universal, 2006).  
Their growing ties certainly undermine United States efforts to isolate Iran economically 
and diplomatically. Iran and Venezuela see American power as a tool to expand and impose the 
capitalist order, and thus dominate and maintain dependency. Similar to the way the Soviets 
wanted to coordinate an international communist movement around the globe, both Iran and 
Venezuela want to lead a worldwide hegemony resistance effort, and thus they utilize all the 
means at their disposals for this goal. Most prominent is the use of petrodollars to build alliances 
under the banner of goodwill and south-to-south solidarity, to finance economic and 
humanitarian projects, international organizations, and public diplomacy against “Washington 
hegemonic agenda.”  
Iran’s growing influence in the American continent is a fluid issue that requires continued 
observation in order to ensure the most efficacious response. United States’ reaction to the Iran-
Venezuela nexus must be carefully calculated, since exaggerating the alleged threat of Iran’s ties 
with Venezuela could cause unintended reactions that would degrade U.S. relations with 
neighboring states (Johnson, 2012). 
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Conclusion 
This thesis attempts to raises the question: to what extent is collective perceptions 
significant to the international behavior of a country? Is it possible that the process that 
determines a state’s foreign behavior starts with a national discourse that eventually becomes a 
code of conduct? Spending time in Venezuela it became clear to me that the message the 
government advocated was resonating among a lot of people within Venezuelan society. This 
was evident, not only by the display of support in the form of t-shirts, hats, and bumper stickers, 
but also by the type of language people used to describe the political reality. By engaging in 
small conversations with people I met daily, it was easy to notice the official discourse in 
people’s “personal” opinion. Themes of revolution, justice, socialism, and independence are 
common among chavistas. This is not different to the way I can recognize the Republican Party 
line within evangelicals. Just like there are a set of norms that are associated with being a “born 
again Christian,” there are also norms and values associated with being a revolutionary in the 
way that Hugo Chavez defined it, or perhaps in the way that Ayatollah Khomeini defined it.   
To answer the above question, this thesis suggest that discourse and language are not 
simply the means through which we express ourselves, but they are also the means through 
which we describe the real world to each other. Discourse represents the contexts from which 
reality will be understood; discourse becomes the only ideational material for the construction of 
identities, and of the behavior associated to that identity. There is now a movement centered on 
criticizing the U.S. in the world. Perhaps the behavior of Iran and Venezuela towards the U.S. is 
a consequence of the type of reality that is being described to the public by their governments, 
and that this discourse is itself the consequence of a specific interpretation of historic events.  
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This becomes significant when the world is being described as “a fight against radicals that hate 
our freedom” or as a “resistance against arrogant powers that want to oppress us and make us 
dependent, like they did in the past”. 
To fanatic followers of Chavez and Khomeini, there is no doubt that the United States 
government is an engine of oppression and exploitation in their region. They see no reality 
outside the context of chavismo or the Islamic Revolution. Whether anti-American idealism 
happened by elites manipulation of people's fears, or as an adoption of a stance to express a 
popular feeling, this culture of resistance set the tone for anti-U.S. nationalist movements in both 
their regions. The consequences of interventions like operation AJAX are impossible to quantify; 
the current nuclear crisis with Iran could very easily be the continuation of a problem that started 
in 1953 with the CIA coup in Iran that weakened the United States’ prestige, and encouraged a 
nationalist mindset among “weaker” countries. This makes one wonder, were interventions like 
operation Ajax really necessary? Did Mosaddegh really represent a threat to the United States or 
was he a menace to an industrial monopoly?  
Illegal behavior, like covert operations, does not advance the U.S. interests at the 
aggregate level. Removing Prime Minister Mosaddegh might have seemed successful at the time, 
but when we see what has happened to Iran after we overthrew its democracy, and then we look 
at Iran now, it doesn't look like a success at all. The ideology triggered by its intervention is 
giving the United States big headaches today, and might have accelerated the relative decline of 
its influence worldwide. The men that wrote the U.S. constitution were concerned that power be 
held accountable, not one person or party was to pick and choose along the laws to be obeyed. 
But how does the people cry foul about their government's behavior when officials can pursue 
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covert operations, and then wave the wand of national security to justify it? 
Today, to be a nationalist in Iran or Venezuela means to be “anti-imperialist.” Anti-
imperialist is understood as being anti-American. To be nationalists also implies solidarity with 
other countries in mutual support against a common "enemy" (Smith, 2008). This is the 
foundation for the current alliance between Iran and Venezuela. Ahmadinejad said about Chavez, 
“[he] is my brother, he is a friend of the Iranian nation and the people seeking freedom around 
the world. He works perpetually against the dominant system (El Universal, 2006).   
The messages of the countries featured in this thesis have a conceptualizing effect on the 
manner in which populations attach meaning to the real world, by introducing themes into the 
political discourse of society. The moment large segments of the populations start to frame their 
worldview within the context of their national discourses, then the message becomes very 
significant to a country’s foreign behavior, perhaps much more significant than the balance of 
capabilities in the international system.  
 The social discourse in the United States is constantly referring to America’s superiority 
and exceptionalism. Unfortunately, the idea of the wellbeing of the fatherland has been 
constructed purely around realist definitions of security in the United States. As a direct result of 
America’s exceptionality identity mixed with realism, the U.S. has had covert operations in 
many nations under the justification of national security. The message regarding Iran in the 
United States has its roots on resentment from the Hostage Crisis of 1979, and it is dominated by 
the “all options are on the table” mentality. By 2010, 80% of Americans believed that Iran either 
had a nuclear bomb or will get one in short order (CNN, 2010). Even as Secretary of Defense 
Leon Panetta has repeatedly stated that the US believes Iran has not decided yet whether to 
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initiate a nuclear weapons program (USA Today, 2012). Despite the official position that Iran 
has no weapons program, most of the political, military, and media are constantly regurgitating 
lines about blocking Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Clearly, it is ideology and not 
material conditions what is driving the U.S. to impose sanctions against Iran’s “defiance.” Rather 
than facts driving beliefs, it is long established beliefs that are dictating the facts we chose to 
accept, and thus the behavior we engage in (Keohane, 2010).  
There is a sense of denial in the part of the U.S. of having any responsibility for the 
ongoing crisis. Joe Biden stated, “We have made clear that Iran’s leaders need not sentence their 
people to economic deprivation and international isolation… There is still space for diplomacy, 
backed by pressure, to succeed. The ball is in the government of Iran’s court” (Croft, 2013). 
Statements like this serve as an affirmation of the notion of dealing with irrational leaders in 
Iran. 
The Iranian message regarding the U.S. focuses on the “shameless” intervention to keep 
the Shah in power, and on the perception of the constant hostility Iran has endured from the West 
since its revolution. Hostilities rooted on the 1954 coup, and the 1979 hostage crisis have 
deterred any cooperation or strategic relations between Iran and the United States. The United 
States’ led effort to punish Iran only perpetuates their commitment to their revolutionary identity, 
because the leadership of the Iranian regime believes in a moral duty to resist “imperial 
bullying.” Iranian officials will not be compelled into doing anything unless they perceive that 
the West is acting on good faith. Ayatollah Khamenei illustrates this when he said, “I am not a 
diplomat. I am a revolutionary and speak frankly, honestly, and firmly. An offer of talks makes 
sense only when the side [that makes the offer] shows its goodwill” (Khamenei, 2013). Exactly 
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what he means when he says “I am a revolutionary” is perhaps the most important factor shaping 
his identity and his view of Iran in the world.  
As long as economic sanctions, sabotage, and scientist assassinations continue, the crisis 
with Iran will never be resolved. Khamenei has expressed:  
You [the Americans] point the gun at Iran and say either negotiate 
or we pull the trigger! You should know that pressure and 
negotiations don’t go together, and that the [Iranian] nation will 
not be intimidated by such things (Khamenei, 2013).  
 
The Ayatollah’s concerns are justified by Pentagon’s policy of deterring any nation or 
group of nations from challenging American primacy by “pursue[ing] endeavors that would 
prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated 
control, be sufficient to generate global power” (Tyler, 1992). It is precisely these “endeavors” 
that the Iranian are so uneasy about, and what feeds their perception of American’s intentions.  
Iran refuses to be dominated by other powers and looks for complete elimination of all kinds of 
despotism in international relations. It is obvious that the current strategy of coercion through 
punishing sanctions is the most difficult and painful way to influence the behavior of Iran. As 
anti-realist as it may sound, the most effective way to persuade Iran into anything will rely on 
trust developing, not on domination.  
The Venezuelan message regarding the U.S. focuses on economic dependency, periphery 
struggle, and in U.S. political interventions in Latin America. Larry King once asked Chavez 
what he considered to be his biggest threat, and without even thinking Chavez replied “the 
empire.” Refereeing to the events of the 2002 coup against him (which chavistas assert was 
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engineered by United States in the same evil practices as with operation AJAX) Chavez 
continued: 
While I was captive I debated with the soldiers ordered to assassin 
me, luckily a group of soldiers refused, but the orders came form 
the White House, I have no doubts in my mind. The same modus 
operandi as when they ordered to kill Salvador Allende, and to kill 
Che Guevara, and to kill Ojeda Rios. The same thing [when it was 
decided] to bombard Panama, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic. 
That is our history and we want a new time. We want peace (Larry 
King Live, 2009). 
   
The response from King flawlessly captures the American reaction to third world 
indignation: “as it may, true or not, that's the past. Let's look to today”; he then followed his 
response by questioning why Venezuela just bought so many weapons from Russia (Larry King 
Live, 2009).  
The discourse about Iran and Venezuela is very positive and optimistic in both countries. 
They both share a populist rhetoric criticizing economic globalization and the notion that 
foreigners want to exert control over their national economies. They showcase their alliance to 
domestic audiences as a way to by-pass the hegemonic powers and their corruptive tendencies. 
The Iran-Venezuela alliance is an easy and confortable relationship that takes pride on pointing 
out that it is based on respect and solidarity rather than on interests. The behavior associated with 
being a chavista in Venezuela, and with being an Islamic revolutionary in Iran are very similar, 
and thus their cooperation comes naturally. Anti-hegemony as a belief system is the cause for 
Iran and Venezuela's behavior. Identity explanations to the behavior of both Venezuela and Iran 
suggest that they genuinely believe that anti-hegemony would eventually vanquish imperialism 
and super powers domination.  
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Similarities of the behavior of Iran and Venezuela are summarized in the following table: 
Case Studies Perception of 
Foreign Domination 
Anti-Hegemony South to South 
Solidarity 
Populist 
Leadership Style 
 
 
Iran 
 
 
 
• Strong perception that 
foreigners seek to control 
its national economy. 
• Independence and self-
reliance is valued above 
all. 
• Sees economic sanctions 
as foreign aggression. 
• See the U.S. as mainly 
being interested in its 
natural resources. 
 
 
 
 
• Sees Hegemony as a sin.  
• Sees itself as a system 
reformer. 
• Calls for a new 
international order that 
checks the influence of 
great powers. 
• Non-Alignment as a foreign 
policy option to politically 
counter hegemony. 
• Resist U.S. policies. 
 
• Sees the word as 
divided between 
oppressors and 
oppressed. 
• Constitutionally it 
is required to help 
the least privileged 
of the world. 
• Charity used as 
public diplomacy to 
generate good will. 
• South-to-South 
solidarity is 
encouraged. 
• Determination to 
exert regional 
leadership. 
 
 
• Charismatic leader 
that mobilizes 
marginalized 
masses. 
• Populist notion of 
nationalization of 
natural resources. 
• Inspiration from a 
cult-like leader: 
Khomeini. 
• Populism as a tool 
of power 
consolidation 
• Oil wealth invested 
into social 
programs. 
 
 
 
Venezuela 
 
 
• Sees itself as being 
liberated from a sphere 
of foreign influence. 
• Independence and self-
reliance is highly valued. 
• Sovereignty seen as a 
national security  
• Strong perception that 
foreigners seek to control 
its national economy. 
• See the U.S. as mainly 
being interested in its 
natural resources. 
 
 
 
 
 
• Has actively advocated the 
creation of regional 
integration to counter 
super-powers influence. 
• Pursued regional integration 
with the goal of reforming 
the system. 
• Actively works to create an 
anti-hegemony political 
bloc in the third world.  
• Resist U.S. policies. 
• Use petroleum 
wealth to pursue 
political integration 
among developing 
states.  
• Place great value 
into helping the 
least privileged.  
• Charity used as 
public diplomacy. 
• Determination to 
exert regional 
leadership. 
• Encourages poor 
countries to work 
together. 
• Charismatic leader 
that mobilizes 
marginalized 
masses. 
• Inspiration of a 
cult-like leader: 
Bolivar, Chavez. 
• Populism as a tool 
of power 
consolidation 
• Populist notion of 
nationalization of 
natural resources. 
• Populism more 
economic. Against 
inequality. 
 
 
Improving the Current Situation 
 
The officer at the Iranian embassy in Caracas told me that it was a lack of trust that was 
getting in the way of improving relations between Iran and the United States. But how can either 
side ever rely on the actions of the other if expectations are developed exclusively on the grounds 
of an ideological struggle? Perhaps the biggest obstacle preventing improvement of the current 
situation is the absence of mechanisms for regular communication between Iran and Venezuela, 
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and the United States. To reverse such powerful belief systems the United States would need a 
systematic procedure for trust development. Social constructs become a reality through regular 
interaction, which can discipline perceptions of power (like making U.S. power less threatening 
to Iran and Venezuela, or Iranian capabilities less threatening to the U.S.).  
The only interactions that exist today between Iran and the United States are in the form 
of sanctions, which are viewed by the regime as a plan to penetrate economically and then 
dominate politically. Iran accuses the U.S. of using illegal sanctions as a way to assault the 
country and force it to comply with its desires, thus violating Iran’s sovereignty and undermining 
its rights. In Venezuela the predominant form of interaction is the acquisition of oil from 
American multi-national corporations. Chavez supporters are quick to point out that the only 
interest of the U.S. in Venezuela is not mutual cooperation but the exploitation of natural 
resources. There is a consensus that the United States follows a purely "business-like" policy in 
foreign affairs. Both forms of interactions reinforce and perpetuate perceived notions in each 
country. In a very different fashion, Ahmadinejad and Chavez had a warm friendship. They had 
interactions at the personal level, which makes it very easy for them to trust the other, and their 
cooperation is evidence of their mutual trust. 
Since new social constructions inevitably starts from the current perception of reality, the 
United States would have to find ways to interact with the Venezuelan and Iranian leaders and 
people as to foster goodwill at a time when antipathy toward U.S. policies is at its highest. The 
United States might need to stop holding Iran and Venezuela as solely responsible for the failing 
of constructive talks, and use persuasive discourse that acknowledges grievances associated with 
past relations while focusing on economic and social rights for the future. Engaging with Iran 
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and Venezuela and finding areas of common interests should be foreign policy goals. Strategic 
engagement with an adversary can go hand in hand with a policy that encourages change in that 
country. That’s how Washington dealt with the Soviet Union and China in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Zakaria, 2011). Any time the United States is able to show goodwill to the Venezuelan and 
Iranian people it should be regarded as a diplomatic success.  
In “the long telegram,” George Kennan stated the United States must "put forward for all 
nations a much more positive and constructive picture of the sort of world we would like to 
see… it is not enough to urge the development of political processes similar to our own." He 
then concluded, "the greatest danger that can befall us is that we shall allow ourselves to become 
like those with whom we are coping" (Kennan, 1947).  Perhaps if international relations are 
strategized with a constructivist awareness, then the United States could lead a coordinated effort 
to a level of international cooperation not known yet to political science, in which idealism 
becomes the new realism. 
 
 
Future Research 
 This thesis focused on the government’s adoption of a normative discourse that 
originated from a historical experience. In our ever-shrinking world, now more than ever it is 
imperative to acknowledge that humans are norm-adopting creatures in order to study political 
behavior realistically. Understanding the contextual variables that determine the norms, values, 
and interests of countries will expand the field of international relations, including the study of 
inter-state conflicts, cooperation, security, trust, and threat.  
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Perhaps the most exciting challenge for future inquiry will be merging qualitative and 
quantitative perspectives into new methodological approaches to research the identity formation 
process that drives the behavior of states. An instance in which perceptions of reality could be 
measure could be a closely contested election, in which one side feels that the elections were a 
fraud. Maybe it is possible to study empirically the effects of a group’s perception of reality on 
its political behavior. Analyzing the various elements that contribute to states perception of 
reality could help develop empirical models to explain socially constructed facts, like a state’s 
identity formation process that eventually results in foreign policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  59 
Works Cited 
 
Abrahamian, E. (1982). Iran between two revolutions. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University 
Press. 
Abrahamian, E. (2008). A history of modern Iran. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press. 
Albert, Mathias (1999). “Observing World Politics: Luhmann’s Systems Theory of Society and 
International Relations,” Millennium, 28, 239-265. 
Alpert, E. (2013). World leaders react to death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. 
latimes.com. March 5th. Retrieved from http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-
fg-wn-venezuela-chavez-death-reactions-20130305,0,7639879.story 
Arabbaghi, K. (2005). Joint Venture to Produce Tractors in Venezuela. Events Magazine. 
Number 8, March. Retrieved from http://www.events.ir/no008/008f.htm 
Armstrong, Scott. (1980). "Failing to Heed the Warnings of Revolution in Iran; Failing to Heed 
the Warning Signs of Iran's Revolution; Misreading the Future of Iran." The Washington 
Post. (October 26, 1980, Sunday, Final Edition): LexisNexis Academic.  
Associated Press (2008). U.S. influence wanes in Latin America. NBC News. October 11th. 
Retrieved from http://www.nbcnews.com/id/27137766/#.UVs2aqV7Sa4 
Baroud, R. (2013). The Iranians Are Coming! Foreign Policy Journal. January 3rd. Retrieved 
from http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2013/01/03/the-iranians-are-coming/ 
Barrett FJ, Srivastva S. (1991). History as a Mode of Inquiry Into Organizational Life: A Role 
for Human Cosmogony. Human Relations 44: 231–254. 
BBC Worldwide. (2007) Iran report examines news on Iran-Venezuela joint oil and Gas 
Company. BBC Monitoring Middle East. Retrieved from 
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic 
 
BBC. (2005). "Venezuela's Chavez marks 1992 uprising, tells inside story of revolution." BBC 
Monitoring Latin America - Radio Nacional de Venezuela. Date Accessed: 2013/02/07. 
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. 
Bodzin, S. (2007). Venezuela, Iran to Team Up on $4 Billion Oil Project. Bloomberg News. July 
12th. Retrieved from http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/2497. 
Bonfili, C. (2010). The United States and Venezuela: The Social Construction of Interdependent 
Rivalry. Security Dialogue, 41:669, p. 674. http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/41/6/669 
  60 
Boot, Max (2003). Neither New nor Nefarious: The Liberal Empire Strikes Back. Current 
History, Vol.102 No.66. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/boot.htm 
Boyd, R. (1983). On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism. Erkenntnis, 19(1), 45–
90. Retrieved from http://www.springerlink.com/index/K4R9200023143N56.pdf 
Burgelman, R. (1983). A Model of the Interaction of Strategic Behavior, Corporate Context, and 
the Concept of Strategy. Academy of management Review, 61–70. Retrieved from 
http://amr.aom.org/content/8/1/61.short 
Business News Americas (2006). PDVSA, Iran's Petropars begin Ayacucho 7 block drilling. 
bnamericas.com. September 20th. Retrieved from 
www.bnamericas.com/news/oilandgas/PDVSA,_Iran's_Petropars_begin_Ayacucho_7_bloc
k_drilling 
Buzan, B. (2009). Theory Talk #35: Barry Buzan on International Society, Securitization, and an 
English School Map of the World. TheoryTalks.org. Retrieved from http://www.theory-
talks.org/2009/12/theory-talk-35.html 
Camacho, C. (2009). Venezuela pledges Iran gas field investment. Platts Oilgram News. 
September 8th. Retrieved from www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic 
Cannon, B. (2011). Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution: Populism and Democracy in a 
Globalized Age. Review by Richard Gott. Journal of Latin American Studies, 42(04), p. 
886. http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0022216X10001628 
Carlson, C. (2007). Venezuelan-Iranian Car Company Releases First Models. 
venezuelanalysis.com. July 10th. Retrieved from http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/2491 
Carlson, C. (2013). Celebrations and Criticisms on Anniversary of 1992 Coup Attempt in 
Venezuela. Venezuelanalysis.com. Feb 5th.  Retrieved from 
http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/7681  
Castillo, M. (2011). Alleged cyberplot points to Venezuela, Iran, documentary says. CNN.com. 
December 14. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/14/world/americas/venezuela-
iran-allegations/index.html?hpt=wo_c2 
Chavez (2013). Letter from President Chavez: “My spirit and my heart is with you”. 
http://www.correodelorinoco.gob.ve/nacionales/carta-presidente-chavez-mi-espiritu-y-mi-
corazon-esta-ustedes/ 
Checkel, J. T. (2011). The Constructive Turn in International Relations Theory. World Politics, 
50(02), 324–348. http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0043887100008133 
  61 
Ciccariello, G. (2012). The Children of 1989: Resurrecting the Venezuelan Dead. History 
Workshop Online. Retrieved from http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/7404 
Cole, J. (2009). Does Iran really want the bomb? Salon.com. October 7. 
http://www.salon.com/2009/10/07/iran_nuclear/ 
Cole, N. (2007). Hugo Chavez and President Bush’s Credibility Gap: The Struggle Against US 
Democracy Promotion. International Political Science Review, 28(4), p. 496. 
http://ips.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0192512107079637 
Cordesman, A. (2012). U.S. And Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, 
Africa and Peripheral States. Center for Strategic & International Studies. pg.10 Retrieved 
from www.csis.org/burke/reports 
Coronil, F. (2011). Venezuela’s Wounded Bodies: Nation and Imagination During the 2002 
Coup. NACLA Report on the Americas (February), p. 35-36. Retrieved from 
https://nacla.org/sites/default/files/A04401035_11.pdf 
Correo del Caroni (2008). Venirán Tractor podría cerrar. Correo del Caroni. February 20th. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.correodelcaroni.com/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view=wrapper&Itemid=
174&id_articulo=90466 
Coster, H. (2010) Iranian Cash Building Bonds with Bolivia. Washington Post. December 5th. 
Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/12/05/AR2010120504743.html. 
Crist, D. (2012). The twilight war: The secret history of America's thirty-year conflict with Iran. 
New York: Penguin Press. Pg 24 
Da Silva, L. (2013, March 6). Latin America After Chávez. NYtimes.com. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/07/opinion/latin-america-after-
chavez.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
 
del Rincon, F. (2011). U.S. knocks down report of Iran, Venezuela missile base. CNN.com. May 
21. Retrieved from 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/americas/05/21/venezuela.iran.missiles/index.html?_s=
PM:WORLD 
Dodson, M. & Dorraj, M. (2008). Populism and Foreign Policy in Venezuela and Iran. 
Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, 71–87. Retrieved from 
www.journalofdiplimacy.org 
Dorraj, M. (2010). Populism And Foreign Policy In Venezuela And Iran. Florida International 
University’s Applied Research Center, p. 17. Retrieved from 
  62 
http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-
bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/whith9&section=10 
EIA. (2012) Venezuela - Analysis. U.S. Energy Information Administration.  eia.gov. October 3 
Retrieved from http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=VE 
El Universal (2001). Venezuela E Irán En Camino Hacia Una Alianza Estratégica'. 
eluniversal.com. May 5th. Retrieved from 
buscador.eluniversal.com/2001/05/21/eco_art_21204AA.shtml 
El Universal (2006). Chávez decorated in Iran; initials cooperation pacts. Eluniversal.com. July 
31st. Retrieved from english.eluniversal.com/2006/07/31/en_pol_art_31A756133.shtml 
Erickson, D. (2008). Requiem for the Monroe Doctrine. Current history. February. P. 59. 
Retrieved from http://ww.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Erikson_Monroe Doctrine_Feb 
2008.pdf 
Farhi, F. (2010). Tehran’s Perspective on Iran – Latin American Relations. Woodrow Wilson 
Center Reports on the Americas. #23. p. 28 Retrieved from 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:Iran+In+LaTIn+amErIca
+Threat+or+%E2%80%98axis+of+annoyance%E2%80%99?#0 
Fars News (2008). Iran to Open 2 Health Clinics in Bolivia. Fars News Agency. October 11th. 
Retrieved from http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8707201530 
Fleischer, A. (2002). George W. Bush: Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer. Retrieved from 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=62610 
Forero, J. (2004). Documents Show C.I.A. Knew of a Coup Plot in Venezuela. The New York 
Times. December 3rd. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/03/international/americas/03venezuela.html?_r=2& 
George, M. (2013). Iran declares day of mourning for anti-U.S. ally Chavez. Reuters. March 6th. 
Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/06/us-venezuela-chavez-iran-
idUSBRE9250CQ20130306 
Gunson, F. (2001). Is Hugo Chavez Insane? - Newsweek and The Daily Beast. Retrieved from 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2001/11/11/is-hugo-chavez-insane.html 
Hersh, S. (2011). Despite Intelligence Rejecting Iran as Nuclear Threat, U.S. Could Be Headed 
for Iraq. Alternet.com. June 3. 
http://www.alternet.org/story/151196/seymour_hersh%3A_despite_intelligence_rejecting_
iran_as_nuclear_threat%2C_u.s._could_be_headed_for_iraq_redux 
Hersh, S. (2011). Iran’s Nuclear Threat—Real or Not? TheNewYorker.com. June 6. Retrieved 
from http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/06/06/110606fa_fact_hersh 
  63 
Herz, J. (1950). Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma. World Politics vol. 2, no.2: 
171-201, at p.157 (Published by Cambridge University Press) 
Hunter, S. (2010). Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International 
Order (p. 17–22). Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger. 
Huntington, S. P. (1999). The Lonely Superpower. Foreign Affairs, 78(2), 35. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/20049207?origin=crossref 
Inter-American Court. (1999). El Caracazo Case, Judgment of November 11, 1999. H.R. No. 29. 
P. 6. http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/Seriec_95_ing.pdf  
Jerusalem Post. (2012). "History lessons." (September 25, 2012 Tuesday): LexisNexis 
Academic.  
Johnson, S. (2012). Iran’s Influence in the Americas. Center for Strategic & International 
Studies. (March). Pg XVI, 3, 
http://csis.org/files/publication/120223_Johnson_IranInfluence_ExecSumm_Web.pdf 
Kennan, G. (1947). X “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4  p. 566 
Khamenei (2003). Address to students at Shahid Beheshti University, May 28, 2003. Retrieved 
from http://edoc.bibliothek.uni-
halle.de:8080/receive/HALCoRe_document_00010394?lang=de 
Khamenei, A. (2010). Message to the Tehran International Nuclear Disarmament Conference: 
‘Nuclear Energy for All, Nuclear Weapons for None”. April 17. 
http://www.iranembassy.org.za/nuclear.html 
 
Khomenei, A. (2002). Address to education ministry officials, July 17, 2002. http://ahl-ul-
bait.com/en.php/page,1894A2851.html?PHPSESSID=0e5198aa3cd1a4d545ea9d320af3d16
9 
Kinzer, S. (2008). In All the Shah's men: An American coup and the roots of Middle East terror 
(p. 67). Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley & Sons. 
Kinzer, S. (2008). Inside Iran's Fury. Smithsonian Magazine. October. 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/iran-fury.html 
Kissinger, H. (1994). Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster. Pg. 462 
  64 
Kohli, A. (2008). Nationalist versus Dependent Capitalist Development: Alternative Pathways in 
a Globalized World. Princeton University, (Comments prepared for the conference on 
“International Inequality” at Brown University, April 4-5, 2008.), p.7. 
Kozloff, N. (2006). Hugo Chávez : oil, politics and the challenge to the United States. New 
York, N.Y: Palgrave Macmillan. P.25. 
Kraul, C. (2009). Lula takes risk in welcoming Ahmadinejad to Brazil. Los Angeles Times. 
November 23th. Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/23/world/la-fg-brazil-
iran23-2009nov23 
Larry King Live (2009). Interview with Hugo Chavez. CNN.com. September 24. Retrieved from 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0909/24/lkl.01.html 
Levitt, S. D., & Dubner, S. J. (2005). Freakonomics: A rogue economist explores the hidden side 
of everything. New York: William Morrow. 
Lewis, 1980. ex envoy rips U.S. policy in Iran. Lawrence Journal-World. September 8th 1989. P. 
5 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2199&dat=19800908&id=BZYyAAAAIBAJ&sjid
=Q-cFAAAAIBAJ&pg=5290,1830751 
Lindsay, R. (2012). Venezuela: The Future of 21st Century Socialism after the Poll. Green Left 
Weekly. October, 30. LexisNexis Academic.  
Marquis, C. (2002). U.S. Bankrolling Is Under Scrutiny for Ties to Chávez Ouster. New York 
Times. Feb 25th. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/25/world/us-
bankrolling-is-under-scrutiny-for-ties-to-chavez-ouster.html 
Marsh, S. (2007). Anglo-American Crude Diplomacy: Multinational Oil and the Iranian Oil 
Crisis, 1951–53. Contemporary British History, 21(1), P.25.  
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13619460600785259 
Marsh, S. (2007). Anglo-American Crude Diplomacy: Multinational Oil and the Iranian Oil 
Crisis, 1951–53. Contemporary British History, 21(1), 25–53. 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13619460600785259 
Mccoy, T. (2012). How Joseph Stalin Invented 'American Exceptionalism'. TheAtlantic.com. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/03/how-joseph-stalin-invented-american-
exceptionalism/254534/ 
McManus, M. (2003). National Energy Policy: Role of West Africa and Latin America. 
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Economic and Business Affairs 
Bureau, US Department of State. http://2001-2009.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/rm/2003/30303.htm 
  65 
Mirabal, L. P. (1996). Crisis de Identidad en Venezuela: El Desdibujado Perfil de Nuestro 
Pueblo. P.15-16. Caracas. Accessed Dec 19 Zulia State Library. 
Morgan, S. (2010). Iran’s growing influence in Latin America. The Middle East. p.15. Retrieved 
from 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:Iran’s+growing+influenc
e+in+Latin+America#2 
Morgenthau, R. (2009). The Emerging Axis of Iran and Venezuela. The Wall Street Journal. 
Sept. 9th. Retrieved from 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:The+Emerging+Axis+of
+Iran+and+Venezuela#0 
Nasseri, L. (2007). Iran, Venezuela to Start Building Joint Petrochemical Plant. Bloomberg 
News. July 2nd. Retrieved from 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&refer=news&sid=anm1Ba4I1enw
. 
Nia, M. (2010). Understanding Iran’s Foreign Policy: An Application of Holistic Constructivism. 
Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International, 9(1), p 151. Retrieved from 
http://alternativesjournal.net/volume9/number1/nia.pdf 
NIE. (2007). Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. National Intelligence Estimate. Retrieved 
from http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports and 
Pubs/20071203_release.pdf 
Nikahd (2012). Conversation with an officer at the Iranian Embassy in Caracas 
Nixon, R. (1979). First Live TV Interview Since His Resignation. The New York Times. 
November 27, 1979: 26 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/01/31 
Pearson, N. (2007). Iran and Venezuela plan anti-U.S. fund. USATODAY.com. January 14th. 
Retrieved from http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-01-14-iran-
venezuela_x.htm 
Pressly, L. (2009). The 'axis of annoyance'. BBC News. August 13th. Retrieved from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8195581.stm 
Priest, D., & Arkin, W. (2011). Top Secret America The Rise of the New American Security 
State. The Washington Post. October 14th. Retrieved from 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-10-14/entertainment/35278687_1_security-rules-
top-secret-america-intelligence-reports 
  66 
Robertson, E. (2011). Caracazo Was “Forerunner” to Anti-Neoliberalism Protests. 
Venezuelanalysis.com. Retrieved from http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/6542 
Romero, C. (2006) Jugando Con El Globo. La política exterior de Hugo Chávez, Caracas, 
Ediciones B. p.8. Retrieved from the Zulia State Library  
Sadjadpour, K. (2008). Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran’s Most Powerful Leader. P 
16. Retrieved from http://edoc.bibliothek.uni-
halle.de:8080/receive/HALCoRe_document_00010394?lang=de 
Sadri, H. (2007). Surrounded: Seeing the World from Iran’s Point of View. Military Review, 
(February). 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:Surrounded:+Seeing+the
+World+from+Iran’s+Point+of+View#0 
Sadri, H. (2013). Lecture Notes. International Organizations Course. University of Central 
Florida. Spring, 2013.  
Sadri, H. A. (1999). Nonalignment as a Foreign Policy Strategy: Dead or Alive. Mediterranean 
Quarterly, 10(2), 113. 
Schlesinger, S., & Kinzer, S. (1999). Bitter fruit: The story of the American coup in Guatemala. 
Boston, Mass.: Harvard University, David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies. 
Schultz, (2009). Quoted from an interview featured on the documentary “The Pariah State”. 
BBC. Aired Feb 14th 2009. http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00ht3p7 
Shear, M., & Wilson, S. (2009). On European Trip, President Tries to Set a New, Pragmatic 
Tone. The Washington Post. April, 5th, 2009. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/04/04/AR2009040400700.htm
l 
Shifter, M. (2013). So Long, Chávez. Inter-American Dialogue. March 5. Retrieved from 
http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3252 
Smith, P. (2008). Talons of the eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the world. New 
York: Oxford University Press. Pg 104. 
Smith, R. (2004). Venezuela's Geopolitical Chess. venezuelanalysis.com. Retrieved from 
https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/579?page=6 
Stubits, A. (2010).  Iran In Latin America Threat Or “Axis Of Annoyance”?. Woodrow Wilson 
Center Reports on the Americas. #23. p. 2  Retrieved from 
  67 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:Iran+In+LaTIn+amErIca
+Threat+or+“axis+of+annoyance”?#0 
Sylvan, D., & Majeski, S. (2009). U.S. foreign policy in perspective: clients, enemies, and 
empire. London; New York: Routledge. 
Sylvia, R. & Danopoulos, C. (2003). The Chavez phenomenon: Political change in Venezuela. 
Third World Quarterly, 24(7), p. 67. 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713701367 
Thaddeus Jackson (2004). Bridging the Gap: Toward A Realist-Constructivist Dialogue. 
International Studies Review 6, No. 2: 338. 
The Economist (2013). Venezuela after Chávez: Now for the reckoning. The Economist. March 
9th. Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21573095-after-14-years-oil-
fuelled-autocracy-hugo-chávezs-successors-will-struggle-keep 
Transparency International (2010). Country Profiles: Venezuela. Retrieved from 
http://www.transparency.org/country#VEN 
Tyler, P. (1992). U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop A One-Superpower 
World. NYtimes.com. March 8 http://work.colum.edu/~amiller/wolfowitz1992.htm 
U.S. Congress (2012). Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 (H.R. 3783). 
Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr3783enr/pdf/BILLS-
112hr3783enr.pdf 
United States Department of State (2002). Review of U.S. Policy Toward Venezuela November 
2001 - April 2002. P. 19. Retrieved from 
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/13682.pdf 
Viotti, P. R., & Kauppi, M. V. (2012). International relations theory. Boston: Longman. 
Von Glaserfield E. (1995). A constructivist approach to teaching. In Constructivism in 
Education. Steffe LP, Gale J (eds.). Erlbaum: Hillsdale, NJ; 3–16. 
Wendt, A. (1987). The agent­structure problem in international relations theory. International 
Organization, 41, pg 363  
Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University Press. P. 25 
Wendt, A. (2004). The State as Person in International Theory. Review of International Studies, 
30(02). Pg 297. Retrieved from 
http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0260210504006084 
  68 
Wendt, A., et al. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it  : the social construction of power 
politics. International Organizations, 13(Spring), p. 392, 404. 
Wood, G. S. (2012). The idea of America: Reflections on the birth of the United States. 
Introduction. New York: Penguin Books. 
Zakaria, F. (2011, October 26). To deal with Iran’s nuclear future, go back to 2008. 
WashingtonPost.com. Retrieved from http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-10-
26/opinions/35280378_1_supreme-leader-nuclear-program-iran-policy 
Zehfuss, M. (2002). Constructivism in international relations: The politics of reality. Pg. 261. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Zinn, H. (2005). A people’s History of the United States: 1942-present. New York: Harper 
Perennial Modern Classics. 
 
